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BEYOND THE UNREALISTIC SOLUTION FOR
DEVELOPMENT PROVIDED BY THE APPENDIX
OF THE BERNE CONVENTION ON COPYRIGHT

Alberto J. Cerda Silva
ABSTRACT

The standards of copyright protection promoted by the Berne Convention
are highly problematic for developing countries because these countries
need to ensure a wide dissemination of works for teaching, scholarship, and
research purposes. In order to accommodate these needs and to promote
accession to this Convention, the 1971 Paris Act of the Berne Convention,
included an Appendix that allowed developing countries to issue
compulsory licenses for translating and/or reproducing foreign works into
languages of general use in their territories. Unfortunately, the Appendix
has not met the needs of developing countries, which, instead, have relied
on idiosyncratic solutions. Additionally, the instrument does not provide
solutions for other needs, such as those of linguistic and cultural minorities,
and it is arguable whether the Appendix applies online.
Section one of this paper provides background information on the needs of
developing countries and shows how the Appendix of the Berne Convention
tried to meet them. Section two analyzes the main limitations of the
mechanism of compulsory licensing adopted by the Appendix. Although,



Alberto J. Cerda Silva, Professor of Law and Technology at the University of Chile Law
School. LL.M. in International Legal Studies, Georgetown University Law Center, 2010;
Master in Public Law, University of Chile, 2003; Bachelor in Law and Social Sciences,
University of Chile, 1999. E-mail: acerda@uchile.cl An earlier version of this article was
presented at the "Theoretical Foundations of Intellectual Property" Seminar by Professor
Julie E. Cohen at Georgetown University Law Center, Fall 2011. The author thanks
Professor Cohen for her highly valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this
article. Priceless feedback was also provided by James Love, Manon Ress, Michelle
Ueland, and attendants to both the Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public
Interest (Aug. 25-27, 2011) and the DC-area S.J.D. Paper Roundtable (Dec. 7, 2011), both
events organized by American University Washington College of Law. Mistakes are
wholly and exclusive responsibility of the author.

2

Beyond the Appendix of the Berne Convention

the mere fact that the Appendix does not comply with its very purpose
should be enough to warrant a new instrument, section three discusses two
additional reasons in favor of adopting a new instrument to meet the needs
of developing countries. In particular, this section focuses on general
welfare and the economic benefits for authors and right holders. Finally,
section four outlines the issues that should be included in a new instrument
that effectively meets development needs.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The standards of copyright protection promoted by the Berne
Convention are highly problematic for developing countries because these
countries need to ensure a wide dissemination of works for teaching,
scholarship, and research purposes. In order to accommodate these needs
and to promote accession to this Convention, the 1971 Paris Act of the
Berne Convention included an Appendix that allowed developing countries
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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to issue compulsory licenses for translating and/or reproducing foreign
works into languages of general use in their territories.
The increasing number of developing countries that have become parties
to the Berne Convention may suggest that the mechanism provided by the
Appendix meets some of the aforementioned needs. Reviewing domestic
copyright legislations of those countries shows, however, that their laws do
not rely on the provisions of the Appendix and have rather developed
idiosyncratic solutions. Moreover, the Appendix does not address the needs
of linguistic and cultural minorities in both developed and developing
countries. It is also arguable whether the Appendix applies to online works.
A new instrument should resolve these limitations by providing real
solutions for the needs of developing countries and linguistic minorities.
This paper proposes what issues should be included in that new instrument.
Section one of this paper provides background information on the needs
of developing countries and shows how the Appendix of the Berne
Convention tried to meet them. Section two analyzes the main limitations of
the mechanism of compulsory licensing adopted by the Appendix.
Although, the mere fact that the Appendix does not comply with its very
purpose should be enough to warrant a new instrument, section three
discusses two additional reasons in favor of adopting a new instrument to
meet the needs of developing countries. In particular, this section focuses on
general welfare and the economic benefits for authors and right holders.
Finally, section four outlines the issues that should be included in a new
instrument that effectively meets development needs.

II.

THE BERNE CONVENTION’S APPENDIX

In 1886, European countries agreed to provide a common minimum legal
standard of protection for copyrighted works through the adoption of the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.1 Even
though some non-European countries were parties to the Convention, they
did so under their colonial status. The actual parties in interest were France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. As a result, the
Convention reflects the interests of these latter countries in achieving an
adequate level of protection, particularly with respect to their potential
colonial markets. Since then, the Convention has undergone successive
1

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sep. 9, 1886, 25
U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (as revised in Paris, France, Jul. 24, 1971) [hereinafter
Berne Convention].
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revisions. The Berlin revision of 19082 is the most significant because it
dispensed with formalities by adopting a system of automatic protection and
set forth a minimum term of protection – the life of the author plus fifty
years post mortem.3
The newly independent countries of the Americas also adopted their own
system for protecting copyrights. Since 1889, through the Treaty of
Montevideo and successive instruments,4 countries in the Americas created
more flexible system of protection to better suit their needs. The InterAmerican system left domestic laws to determine the length of the term of
protection and required registration of works for copyright protection.5
Works that did not comply with these formalities were abandoned to the
public domain. In addition, as a general policy, countries of the Americas
refused European countries entry into the Inter American system,
effectively denying protection to works by their former colonizers. 6 A more
relaxed standard of protection and the refusal to protect European works are
both signs of “differing interests regarding printed works.”7 Countries in the
Americas rejected European hegemony and claimed legal obstacles to adopt
the European copyright model. In reality, however, these countries were
convinced that this model was inconvenient for culture-importing
countries.8
After World War II, the progressive decolonization of Africa and Asia
diminished the efficacy of the Berne Convention. The Convention’s
“colonial clause” was supposed to provide continuity of copyright
protection in decolonized territories. The clause, however, was insufficient
to meet this goal because it still required the new former colonies to either
ratify or withdraw from the Convention.9 Since the high standards of the
2

Id. (as revised at Berlin, Germany, Nov. 13, 1908).
Id. at art. 7 (as revised at Brussels, Belgium, Jun. 26, 1948) (this period became
mandatory in the 1948 Brussels Act).
4
Montevideo Copyright Convention on Literary and Artistic Property, Jan. 11, 1889,
171 C.T.S. 453.
5
See Inter-American Convention on the Rights of the Author in Literary, Scientific and
Artistic Works, Jun. 22, 1946, O.A.S.T.S. No. 39 (showing that only in 1946 did the InterAmerican System abolish the formalities).
6
See Ulrich Uchtenhagen, Acerca de la Historia de las Convenciones de Derechos de
Autor Latinoamericanas, in LA PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS DE AUTOR EN EL SISTEMA
INTERAMERICANO 71, 78-80.
7
Id.
8
See Delia Lipszyc, Esquema de la Protección Internacional del Derecho de Autor por
las Convenciones del Sistema Interamericano, in LA PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS DE
AUTOR EN EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO, supra note 6, at 20; See also ARCADIO PLAZAS,
Estudios Sobre Derecho de Autor: Reforma Legal Colombiana [Study on Author’s Rights:
Legal Reform in Colombia], 102-03 (1984) (referring to a general “isolationism” of LatinAmerican countries in relation to their international commitments on copyright).
9
Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 31.
3
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Convention did not meet the expectations of these new developing
countries, they had little incentive to become parties.
At that time, and still today, developing countries need to disseminate
knowledge on a wide basis. The artificial scarcity created by copyright law
prevents the achievement of this goal. The high prices of works published
overseas hamper the implementation of public policies for the extensive use
of copyrighted works to promote educational, cultural, and technical
development. Public purchases and voluntary licensing have not met those
needs because the fees charged are unreasonable in the context of limited
economic resources in developing countries. To become parties to the Berne
Convention, developing countries required appropriate flexibilities for
satisfying those needs.10
Although the Berne Convention does offer some flexibilities, these run
short of meeting the needs of developing countries. For instance, the
Convention allows access to copyrighted works through exceptions and
limitations. Established in domestic legislations, exceptions and limitations
dispense with the requirements of consent from and/or payment to the rights
holders. These exceptions, however, are severely limited by the so-called
Berne three-step test which establishes that exceptions must be (1) limited
to special cases, (2) do not conflict with normal exploitation of the work,
and (3) do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author.11 This test prevents the extensive use of works by countries because,
even if the policy rationale is more altruistic and urgent than providing mere
entertainment in small restaurants,12 the test arguably disallows massive use
of copyrighted works with regards to education.

10

See Irwin A. Olian, Jr., International Copyrights and the Need of Developing
Countries: The Awakening at Stockholm and Paris, 7 Cornell Int’l L. J. 81, 88-95 (1974)
(describing the needs of developing countries by the time of the adoption of the Paris Act
of the Berne Convention). See generally PETER DRAHOS AND JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 74-79, (2002)
(describing historical and current challenges and limitations that developing countries face
for accessing works in compliance with international instruments on copyright).
11
See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(2) (permitting the reproduction of works
under the expressed circumstances); see also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M 1197, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement] (adopting a similar test, but extending its scope beyond reproduction
and requiring not unreasonably prejudicing the legitimate interests of the rights holder).
12
See Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, document
WT/DS160/R
(Jun.
15,
2000),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news00_e/1234da.pdf (deciding that this section
infringes on the Berne-three step test when it releases restaurants and other businesses that
play music for the public from paying royalties to the original artists under specific
conditions).

WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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Another flexibility provided by the Berne Convention to all its parties is
the so-called “ten-year regime” clause, an optional early lapsing of
protection for some works. The provision allows a State party to end the
protection of the exclusive right of translation if a given work is not
available in a language of general use in the said country within ten years
from the work’s first publication.13 As a result, the work enters into the
public domain in that country and anyone is allowed to exploit it. This
result may facilitate meeting the needs of developing countries because it
enables the massive use of works for educational purposes. The “ten-year
regime” flexibility, however, is not satisfactory for several reasons. First,
this provision intends to entice countries to become part of the Berne
Convention, not to meet the needs of developing countries. Countries are,
in fact, only allowed to enjoy this exception by making a reservation when
they become party to the Convention.14 Second, nothing in the Convention
prevents countries from retaliating against authors from countries that have
implemented this provision.15 Third, the mechanism provided by the “tenyear regime” is incompatible with special provisions in the Appendix that
allow developing countries to issue compulsory licenses.16 Last but not
least, this flexibility delays access to works for a significant amount of time.
Although a delay may not be a serious problem in social sciences and
philosophy, it is unacceptable in other fields, such as technology, computer
science, epidemiology, oncology, and medicine. As a result of those
limitations, countries that become parties to the Berne Convention have
rarely made the aforementioned reservation and, therefore, this exception
has become useless.17

13

See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 30(2)(b) (setting special provisions on
translation rights for acceding countries), Appendix, art. V (establishing that acceding
developing countries can chose between the ten year regime and the compulsory licensing
system set forth in the Appendix, but cannot combine those choices).
14
See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION [WIPO], GUIDE TO THE BERNE
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS ACT, 1971)
172 (1978) [hereinafter WIPO Guide] (ratifying that the ten-year regime is an available
irrevocable choice that must be made at the time of ratifying or acceding to the
Convention).
15
See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 30(2)(b) (stating that “any country has the
right to apply, in relation to the right of translation of works whose country of origin is a
country availing itself of such a reservation, a protection which is equivalent to the
protection granted by the latter country”).
16
See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. V.
17
See WIPO, Berne Convention Contracting Parties and Notifications
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/index.html (last visited: Nov. 26, 2011)
[hereinafter Contracting Parties] (showing that since the adoption of the 1971 Paris Act of
the Berne Convention only a few countries have reserved the right to lapse protection for
non-translated works: Slovenia and some successors of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, namely, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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In 1952, under UNESCO sponsorship, the Universal Copyright
Convention was adopted to overcome the gap between the needs of
developing countries and the protection promoted by the European
nations.18 This Convention provided a bridge to the higher standards of the
Berne Convention by adopting some flexibilities, including exceptions,
limitations, and a shorter term of protection.19 The bridge, however, was
one-way because it did not allow movement from the Berne Convention to
the Universal Convention.20 This solution was unsatisfactory because it did
not encourage developing countries to join the Berne Convention standards
and, at the same time, it did not prevent the few developing countries that
were already parties from withdrawing from the Berne Convention.
Therefore, working out a different solution became imperative.
A first attempt at agreeing on a mechanism to insert flexibilities into the
Berne Convention was the 1967 Stockholm Act.21 The flexibilities included
in this protocol were based on the expiration of copyright protection for
foreign works that were not translated into the relevant language of a given
developing country.22 The lack of ratification of the protocol, particularly
by developed countries, quickly evidenced the Act’s uselessness.23 A
second attempt concluded with the simultaneous adoption of almost
identical modifications by the Universal Copyright Convention and their
inclusion in the Appendix of the Berne Convention via the 1971 Paris Act.24

18

See Universal Copyright Convention, Appendix Declaration relating to Article XVII
and Resolution concerning Article XI, Sep. 6, 1952, 68 Stat. 1030, 216 U.N.T.S. 132
[hereinafter UCC].
19
See
DELIA LIPSZYC, COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 604-05, 751
(1999) (referring to the Universal Copyright Convention as a first step in the process of
accessing to the Berne Convention); RICARDO ANTEQUERA, EL NUEVO DERECHO DE
AUTOR EN VENEZUELA 572 (1994) (referring to the Universal Copyright Convention as a
bridge to the Berne Convention).
20
See id; UCC supra note 18, Appendix Declaration on Article XVII.
21
Berne Convention, supra note 1 (as revised at Stockholm, Jul. 14, 1967).
22
For background, analysis and aftermaths of the Stockholm Act of the Berne
Convention, see SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, 590-630 (1987); SAM RICKETSON AND JANE
C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE
CONVENTION AND BEYOND 881–924 (2006); see generally CARLOS MOUCHET, EL
DERECHO DE AUTOR INTERNACIONAL EN UNA ENCRUCIJADA (1969); Ndéné Ndiaye, The
Berne Convention and Developing Countries, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 47 (19861987).
23
See Peter DRAHOS and John BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10, at 77.
24
See Eugen Ulmer, The Revisions of the Copyright Conventions, 2 INT’L REV. INTELL.
PROP. AND COMPETITION L. 345, 347 (1971) (stating that “with isolated exceptions and
apart from the arrangement of the two systems, the substantive provisions common to both
Conventions (rules governing exception to the rights of translation and reproduction) were
drafted in identical terms”).

WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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Ever since, both international instruments have provided developing
countries with a mechanism of flexibilities that allows issuing compulsory
licenses for translating and/or reproducing published copyrighted works, as
explained below.25
The Appendix compulsory licensing system is specifically designed for
developing countries. Countries interested in implementing the system need
to qualify as developing countries according to the practices of the United
Nations, and periodically notify the Director General of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).26 In addition, even if the
Appendix provisions were self-executing,27 countries still need to
incorporate several provisions into domestic law. For instance, rules
determining the competent authority to issue licenses, application
procedures, and safeguards for right holders, among others. Overall, to be
fully operative, the mechanism adopted by the Appendix requires notifying
the Director General of WIPO and implementing measures into domestic
law.28
The competent authority of a given developing country may issue nonexclusive non-transferable compulsory licenses for29 (a) translating a work
into a language of general use in the country and publishing it in printed or
other analogous form, for teaching, scholarship or research purposes;30
and/or (b) reproducing a published work in printed or other analogous form
for use in connection with systematic instructional activities.31 For
translation, there is a waiting period that varies depending on the language
of the original work. For reproduction, the waiting period depends on
whether the work is technical or not.
The Appendix adopts several safeguards in favor of right holders. In
addition to the aforementioned requirements for obtaining a license for
translating and/or reproducing a protected work, a potential licensee must
be a national of the country that issues the license. Before obtaining a

25

But see Olian, supra note 10, at 109 (arguing that, in fact, even though the
Convention introduced a regime for compulsory licensing in favor of developing countries,
the Paris Act’s ultimate goal was unifying the systems of the Berne Convention and the
Universal Copyright Convention rather than designing a solution for developing countries).
26
Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. I (1) and (2).
27
See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 36 (1) (setting forth that whether the
provisions of Convention are self-executing is a determination of domestic law).
28
See PLAZAS, supra note 8, at 166.
29
Additionally, the Appendix set forth a compulsory license for broadcasting in
developing countries on the underlying idea that those countries might take advantage of
providing education through the broadcasting system. However, this licensing is not
analyzed for purposes of this paper, which focuses on the translation and reproduction of
printed material rather than on its broadcast.
30
See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. II.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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compulsory license, the potential licensee must find the right holder and try
to obtain a voluntary license from her/him. After the compulsory license has
been issued, works must indicate in each copy that they are available under
the Appendix provisions. Additional regulations must ensure the quality of
the translation, accuracy of the reproduction, and payment of a fair
compensation consistent with royalty standards regarding freely negotiated
licenses between persons in the two relevant countries. Except in some
limited circumstances, exporting the work is prohibited. If the work
becomes available at a reasonable price through the rights holder or if the
country that issued the license no longer classifies as a developing country,
the compulsory license must cease, but existing copies may be distributed
until their stock is exhausted.32
The Appendix proscribes Convention Members from retaliating against
countries that issue compulsory licenses.33 This guarantee was unanimously
agreed upon to prevent countries from resorting to the breach of their own
obligations under the Convention in order to inhibit other countries from
issuing these licenses.34 Therefore, unlike the ten-year regime clause, right
holders whose countries of origin have issued compulsory licenses should
not fear lesser protection in other countries whose authors have been
affected by the compulsory licenses issued by the right holder’s own
country.35
In sum, the Appendix of the Berne Convention intends to provide a
solution for developing countries. The Appendix authorizes developing
countries to issue non-exclusive and non-transferable licenses to translate
and/or reproduce works published in printed or analogous forms for
satisfying domestic educational and research needs. Issuing these licenses is
subject to the condition that right holders receive fair compensation. In this
sense, the Appendix enables developing countries to ensure a wider

31

See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. III.
See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, arts. I (4), II (6), and III (6).
33
See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. I(6)(a); see also UNESCO
Conference for Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention, Paris, 1973, Report of the
General Repporteur [sic] of the Universal Copyright Convention, ¶¶ 58 – 59 [hereinafter
Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention 1973] (explaining a similar implicit
provision in relation with the compulsory licensing system granted by the Universal
Copyright Convention).
34
See Ulmer, supra note 24, at 356.
35
See WIPO Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention Paris,
Jul. 5-24, 1971, General Report of Paris Conference, ¶ 28 [hereinafter General Report of
Paris Conference 1971] (noting that this guarantee is without prejudice of the right of any
country to apply the comparison of terms clause, also known as the rule of the shorter
term).
32
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dissemination of knowledge through textbooks, manuals, etc. for teaching,
scholarship or research purposes.36
III.

LIMITATIONS OF THE APPENDIX MECHANISM

After some years in force, the Appendix apparently achieved its political
goal of making the Convention more appealing to developing countries,
which have adhered to it under the promise of benefiting from the
provisions especially tailored for them. In 1970, the year before the
adoption of the Appendix, there were only 58 signatory countries to the
Convention. Of these, 21 were OECD members (all-OECD members except
the United States), and 28 were European countries. Notably, after the
adoption of the Appendix, as shown in figure 1, the number of parties has
continuously increased through the years and expanded across the world.
Today, the Convention has 164 Members.37 This success may suggest the
Appendix of the Berne Convention provided an effective solution for
developing countries. Such a conclusion is inaccurate for the reasons
explained below.
Developing countries have become parties to the Berne Convention
because of the TRIPS Agreement. Until 1990, only 83 countries were
parties to the Convention. The number has since then doubled due to the
negotiations of what would become the World Trade Organization, which
requires its members to join the Berne Convention. Therefore, a significant
number of countries may have joined the Convention not because they
agree with its standards but because they wish access markets for their
agricultural goods.38 Regardless of the reason for joining the Convention,
when analyzing the real application and challenges of the Appendix, it
becomes clear that the Appendix does not create a mechanism that
developing countries can use to address the problems associated with their
stage of development.

36

See WIPO Guide, supra note 14, at 153.
Contracting Parties, supra note 17.
38
See Peter Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 37179 (2006) (describing the four different narratives used to explain the origins of the TRIPS
Agreement and why developing countries became parties).
37
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Figure 1: Berne Convention and OECD Members, 1970 - 2010

SOURCE: WIPO and OECD websites, 2011.

The Appendix of the Berne Convention does not work because it does not
meet the needs of developing countries. Instead, the Appendix comes across
as an obsolete, inappropriate, bureaucratic, and extremely limited attempt to
provide an air valve for developing countries. The following pages describe
and analyze some objections to the provisions of the Appendix in order to
inform a proposal for amending it –which is also discussed below.
A. The Appendix Does Not Work for Developing Countries
The assumption that developing countries already have a solution
contrasts with the actual (non-)use of the Appendix and the relevant
domestic copyright laws. First, only a handful of countries have notified the
Director General of the WIPO of their interest in the Appendix provisions.
Second, several countries that have introduced in their domestic law similar
mechanisms to that of the Appendix have not notified the Director General
of the WIPO of such adoption because of the mechanism’s uselessness.
Instead, countries have adopted idiosyncratic solutions into their domestic
law to mitigate the limitations of the mechanism provided by the Berne
Convention.
A small number of developing countries have availed themselves to use
the flexibilities provided by the Appendix. As was mentioned before,
countries must periodically notify the Director General of the WIPO which,
in turn, allows them to issue compulsory licenses according to the
Appendix.39 In fact, as of 2011, the WIPO’s online registry of notifications

39

Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. I (1) and (2) (requiring the renew of
self-availing by notification to the Director General of the WIPO each 10 years).
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states that only 15 of the 164 parties of the Convention have availed
themselves to enjoy the benefit of these compulsory licenses.40 Most of
these are from Asia and the Middle East,41 plus one African and one Latin
American country.42 Most of these countries are newcomers to the
international copyright forum that joined the Convention in the context of
becoming parties to TRIPS and intended to benefit from the Appendix
flexibilities.
Notifying WIPO, does not by itself make the compulsory licensing
mechanism functional for a developing country. The mechanism must be
properly implemented into domestic law. Several countries that have
notified WIPO have yet to implement compulsory licensing for translation
and/or reproduction into their domestic law. This is the case of Mongolia,43
Oman,44 Philippines,45 Samoa,46 Sri Lanka,47 Uzbekistan,48 and Yemen49
40

See
Notifications
on
the
Berne
Convention,
WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&search_what=N&treaty_id=15
(last visited: May 15, 2011).
41
VICTOR NABHAN, WIPO STANDING COMMITTEE ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED
RIGHTS, STUDY ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS FOR COPYRIGHT FOR EDUCATIONAL
PURPOSES
IN
THE
ARAB
COUNTRIES
56-57
(2009),
available
at
www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_19/sccr_19_6.doc
(identifying
several
countries that have implemented Appendix-like licensing systems into their domestic law,
but clarifying that “scant or even non-existent” results, have rendered these systems “dead
letter”).
42
Availed countries are: Bangladesh, Cuba, Jordan, Mongolia, Oman, Philippines,
Samoa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, United Arabs Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vietnam,
and Yemen.
43
See Law of Mongolia on Copyright and Related Rights art 24, (Jan. 19, 1993) (setting
for mere copyright exceptions and limitations, but any compulsory licensing for translation
and reproduction).
44
See Royal Decree No. 65/2008 Promulgating the Law on Copyright and Related
Rights art. 20 of 17 May 2008 (Oman) (recognizing barely some extremely limited
exceptions, essentially for reproductions, but any compulsory licensing).
45
See Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, Rep. Act No. 8293, §§ 176.1, 18485, 237 (1997) (Phil), (setting for several exceptions, including one for public use by the
government, the National Library, or by educational institutions; fair use exceptions;
requiring governmental approval for using any work of the Government); See also,
VICENTE AMADOR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FUNDAMENTALS 398-99 (2007) (referring to
the latter provision and expressing that that use “may” require payment of royalties);
Jacinto D. Jimenez, Intellectual Property Law in Philippines, in 42 International
Encyclopaedia of Laws 3, 43-48 (2007) (describing the wide system of limitations and
exceptions in Philippine law, but no mention to a compulsory licensing system currently in
force); RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMENTS AND
ANNOTATIONS 109 (2006) (referring to § 239 that repealed the old copyright law, including
a provision that authorized compulsory licensing for reprinting needed expensive foreign
books). However, the Intellectual Property Code prescribes that Philippines shall avail
itself of the special provisions regarding developing countries, including provisions for
licenses grantable by competent authority under the Appendix.
46
See Copyright Act 1998 arts. 8 – 10, 1998 (Samoa) (providing some narrow
exceptions for reproduction for education and research purposes, but no compulsory
license); see also, Sue Farran, South Pacific Intellectual Property Law, 51 International
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that barely have some copyright exceptions and limitations. Other countries
that have notified WIPO, have implemented both exceptions and a
compulsory licensing mechanism that differs significantly from the
Appendix. For instance, the United Arab Emirates has a flexible
compulsory licensing mechanism.50 Sudan51 and Syria52 have a general
compulsory licensing regime for using copyrighted works based on reasons
of public interest. Cuba has a similar system that is royalty free;53 Vietnam
also has a similar system that does not mention payment. 54 Jordan has a
public interest compulsory license that is limited to publication and
republication, recognizes fair compensation,55 and also a license system

Encyclopaedia of Laws, Kluwer International, 1, 36 – 38 (2006) (discussing limitations and
exceptions in the copyright law of South Pacific’s countries, including Samoa, but omitting
any mention to a Samoan compulsory licensing system).
47
See Intellectual Property Act, No. 36 of 2003 (Sri Lanka); See also, D.M.
KARUNARATNA, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN SRI
LANKA, 76 – 90 (2006) (analyzing limitations and exceptions, and fair use in Sri Lankan
domestic law, but omitting any reference to a compulsory licensing system).
48
See Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Copyright and Related Rights, art. 26,
2006 (reproducing an exception available in its previous copyright law that barely set forth
an exception for purposes of research, criticism or information in the form of quotations
from disclosed works in the original language or in translation).
49
See Intellectual Property Law No. 19, 1994, art. 38 (Yemen) (setting for a
compulsory license for public domain works, but any for translation).
50
See Federal Law No. 7 of the Year 2002 Concerning Copyrights and Neighboring
Rights (U.A.E.) art. 21 (setting forth a soft-regulated compulsory license for translation
and/or reproduction of works).
51
See Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection Act 1996 (Sudan), §§ 14, 20(1)
(setting forth several limited exceptions, essentially for reproduction, including one for
translation for personal and private use and providing a compulsory license, according to
which, in case of public interest, government may require right holder publication of a
work, under sanction of order its publication with compensation)[hereinafter Sudan
Copyright Law].
52
See Law No. 12/2001 §§ 21, 37 of 27 Feb. 2001 (Copyright Law of Syria) (setting
forth several exceptions that allow the reproduction of works in its source language or its
translation, including some for educational and research purposes and adopting a
compulsory license; in case of public interest, government may require right holder
publication of a work, under sanction of order its publication with compensation).
53
See Ley No. 14 del Derecho de Autor [Copyright Act], updated, art. 37, 1977 (Cuba)
(setting forth a compulsory license without payment for public utility reasons).
54
See Intellectual Property Law No. 50/2005/QH11, Nov. 29, 2005 (Viet.) arts. 7, 25,
42-43 (setting forth a compulsory license for using works based on reason of public
interest, adopting an exception for reproduction, but not translation of works, remitting
public domain to governmental regulation, and establishing works which copyright is hold
by the state); see also, Decree No. 100/2006/ND-CP Detailing and Guiding the
Implementation of a Number of Articles of the Civil Code and the Intellectual Property
Law Regarding the Copyright and Related Rights (Sep. 21, 2006), art. 29 (Viet.) (clarifying
that licenses and payments are required for state works, but not for public domain ones).
55
See Law No. 22 of 1992 on the Protection of Copyright and its Amendments
(Jordan), as amended by Amending Law No. 9 of 2005, art. 27.
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similar to the Appendix mechanism.56 The latter licensing system has been
adopted by Bangladesh57 and Thailand.58 In sum, compulsory licensing in
compliance with the Appendix has been implemented only in three of the
countries that have notified WIPO: Jordan, Bangladesh, and Thailand.
The Appendix has not succeeded among the countries that have notified
WIPO’s General Director of their interest in using the mechanism. Only
three of these fifteen developing countries have implemented the
mechanism into domestic law. Additional research is needed to determine if
those three countries are actually using the mechanism. It may be argued
that developing countries have merely neglected renewing their notification
to WIPO. The countries have actually implemented the mechanism into
domestic law and are enjoying the benefits of the Appendix. Unfortunately,
this is not the case. A review of the copyright laws of several developing
countries in Africa and Latin America shows that they are not beneficiaries
of the falsely generous Appendix provisions.
African countries do not use the Appendix mechanism.59 Africa, as a
continent, contributes 0.3% of the global book exports.60 According to
recent research on copyright regulation in eight African countries, only

56

See Law No. 22 of 1992 on the Protection of Copyright and its Amendments
(Jordan), as amended by Amending Law No. 9 of 2005, art. 11 (setting forth a like-theAppendix compulsory license for translating and/or publishing “in a printed form or any
other form” to the Arabic language).
57
See Copyright Act 2000 No. 28 of 2000 (as amended up to 2005) §§ 50-54 (Bangl.)
(setting forth a compulsory license for using Bangladeshi works, adopting another
compulsory license for Bangladeshi works by dead, unknown or his whereabouts is
unknown to publish and translate them to any language and implementing the compulsory
licensing system of the Appendix of the Berne Convention into domestic law); see also,
MOHAMMAD MONIRUL AZAM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, WTO, AND BANGLADESH, 197 –
201 (2008); and NAZNIN HOSSAIN AND SHARIFA AKTAR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
114-124 (2009).
58
Copyright Act, B.E. 2537 (1994) (Thai.), §§ 54 – 55 (allowing government to issue
compulsory licensing under requirements lightly more flexible than those of the Appendix
of the Berne Convention); see also, Thailand, GLOBAL CONSUMERS NETWORK ON ACCESS
TO
KNOWLEDGE, BROADBAND, CONSUMER RIGHTS AND REPRESENTATION,
http://a2knetwork.org/reports2009/thailand (last visited April 6, 2012) (reporting that these
licenses are “very difficult to obtain”).
59
See JOSEPH FOMETEU, WIPO STANDING COMMITTEE ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED
RIGHTS, STUDY ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS FOR COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS
FOR
TEACHING
IN
AFRICA
42
(2009),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=130241 (reporting some African
countries that have adopted Appendix-like compulsory licenses, in spite of which not even
one compulsory license has been issued).
60
See CENTRO REGIONAL PARA EL FOMENTO DEL LIBRO EN AMÉRICA LATINA, EL
CARIBE, ESPAÑA Y PORTUGAL (CERLALC), EL ESPACIO IBEROAMERICANO DEL LIBRO
2010, 100 (2010) [hereinafter Fomento del Libro America Latina].
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Uganda has implemented the Appendix compulsory licensing system.61 In
spite of not even being a party to the Berne Convention, Uganda has
implemented the Appendix provisions into its domestic law in addition to
other copyright limitations.62 Five other countries have barely implemented
standard copyright limitations and exceptions: Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique,
Morocco, and Senegal.63 Meanwhile, as explained earlier, Egypt and South
Africa have not implemented the Appendix mechanism. Rather, both have
implemented an idiosyncratic solution.64 Sudan is another country that
adopted a peculiar solution that allows the government to order publishing a
work based on public interest subject to royalty payments to the right
holders.65
Developing Latin-American countries do not use the Appendix
mechanism either.66 According to the United Nations, in 2011, 33 of 35
countries of the Americas, all but the United States and Canada, qualify as
developing countries and, accordingly, potential users of the Appendix
mechanism.67 But, according to WIPO’s register, only Cuba currently uses
the mechanism.68 A brief collection of data for this paper shows, however,
that six other countries in the region have implemented compulsory licenses
for translation into their domestic laws despite not having notified WIPO.
Some countries have adopted insubstantial provisions into their domestic
laws that are ambiguous and insufficient to become operable. This is the

61

ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF COPYRIGHT 327 (Armstrong et al,
eds., 2010).
62
See Copyright and Neighboring Rights Act (2006) (Uganda), §§ 17 and 18 (setting
forth a non-exclusive and non-transferable compulsory license for translation and/or
reproduction of copyrighted works from foreign languages to English, Swahili or any
Ugandan language), see also, Dick Kawooya, Ronald Kakungulu and Jeroline Akubu,
Uganda, in ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 61, at 283, 288.
63
See ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN AFRICA, supra note 61, at 326-327.
64
See, infra notes 112 – 116 and accompanying text (describing the Egyptian
mechanisms); see also infra notes 94 – 97 and accompanying text (describing the South
African provisions).
65
See, Sudan Copyright Law, supra note 51 and accompanying text.
66
See PLAZAS, supra note 8, at 211 (stating that, by the 80’s, the Appendix of the Berne
Convention had not have any application within Latin America and the Caribbean).
67

U.N. Statistics Div., Composition of macro geographical (continental) regions,
geographical sub-regions, and selected economic and other groupings (Apr. 26, 2011),
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#ftnc (stating that “[t]here is no
established convention for the designation of "developed" and "developing" countries or
areas in the United Nations system”, but, in common practice, Canada and the United
States are considered "developed").
68
Declaration by the Republic of Cuba Relating to Articles II and III of the Appendix to
the Paris Act (1971), (Jun. 28, 2004), available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/berne/treaty_berne_238.html
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case of El Salvador,69 Honduras,70 and Panama.71 There is no evidence that
these countries have issued any compulsory licenses. The laws of
Colombia,72 the Dominican Republic,73 and Mexico,74 in contrast, are better
drafted and provide a sufficient legal regime for issuing compulsory
licensing. There is no evidence, however, that these countries have issued
any compulsory licenses either.
In spite of having implementing laws, neither Colombia nor Mexico uses
the Appendix mechanism. The Colombian competent authority has failed to
notify WIPO and argues that the mechanism provided by its domestic
copyright law is no longer in force because of its own negligence.75 As a

69

See Decreto No. 604 Ley de Fomento y Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual [Law
on the Promotion and Protection of Intellectual Property], art. 77, 1993, (El Sal.) (setting
forth that the competent judge shall grant compulsory license for translation and
reproduction set forth in international conventions ratified by the country, previous
compliance with the requirements stated by them).
70
See Decreto 4-99-E, 2000, Ley del Derecho de Autor y de los Derechos Conexos
[Copyright and Neighboring Rights Act], art. 122, 2006 (Hond.)(providing that
government, through the Administrative Office for Copyright and Neighbor Rights, could
grant non-exclusive license for the reproduction and translation of foreign works according
to the provisions of articles 2 and 3 of the Appendix of the Berne Convention).
71
See Ley sobre el Derecho de Autor y Derechos Conexos [Copyright and Neighboring
Rights Act], 1994, art. 84 (Pan.) (allowing the authority designed by decree to grant nonexclusive license to translate and reproduce foreign works for the purpose and in
compliance with the requirements set forth by the Universal Copyright Convention and
other international covenants ratified by Panama).
72
See
Ley sobre Derechos de Autor [Copyright Act], feb. 19, 1982, DIARIO
OFICIAL [D.O] (Colom.), arts. 45 – 71 (setting forth a heavily regulated system of
compulsory licenses for reproduction and translation of foreign works into Spanish). See
also, MINISTERIO DE GOBIERNO (DE COLOMBIA), LOS DERECHOS DE AUTOR EN COLOMBIA
(1982); and ERNESTO RENGIFO GARCÍA, PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL: EL MODERNO
DERECHO DE AUTOR 178 (1996).
73

See L. No. 65-00 de Derecho de Autor [Copyright Act], agosto. 24, 2000, Diario
Oficial (Dom. Rep.); and, Decreto N° 362-01 que establece el reglamento de aplicación de
la Ley N° 65-00 sobre Derecho de Autor [Decree on Implementing Regulations of the
Copyright Act], art. 24, mar. 14, 2001 (Dom. Rep.)(setting forth a regime for nonexclusive and non-transferable compulsory licenses to translate and reproduce foreign
works for the purposes and in compliance with the requirements of such licenses, according
to the international treaties in which the Dominican Republic is a party).
74
See Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor [Federal Law on Copyright], Diario Oficial de
la Federación [DO], 24 dic. de 1996, as consolidated jul. 2003 (Mex.), art. 147; and,
Reglamento de la Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor [Regulation of the Federal Law of
Copyright], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 22 de mayo de 1998, as amended Sep.
14, 2005 (Mex.), arts. 38 – 43. See also, GABINO CASTREJÓN GARCÍA, TRATADO TEÓRICOPRÁCTICO DE LOS DERECHOS DE AUTOR Y DE LA PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL 102-105,
(2001); and, FERNANDO SERRANO MIGALLÓN, NUEVA LEY FEDERAL DEL DERECHO DE
AUTOR 163 (1998) (referring that even when the copyright act adopts a compulsory
licensing bases on grounds of public interest, its regulation complies with international
law).
75
See DIRECCIÓN NACIONAL DE DERECHO DE AUTOR, mayo 21, 2010, Legal Opinion 12010-7340 (Colom.) (arguing that provisions of the copyright law on compulsory licenses
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result, no compulsory license has ever been issued.76 In the case of Mexico,
whose last notification to WIPO took place in 1984, the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) set forth an additional requirement for
issuing compulsory licenses. Under NAFTA, compulsory licenses shall not
be issued if translation and reproduction needs can be met by voluntary
actions of rights holder.77 Nevertheless, the non-use of the mechanism has
not been a serious problem because despite of its longstanding
implementation into domestic law,78 the mechanism was never used.79
Although the reason for this lack of use is unclear, authorities suspect that
costly paperwork and the limited scope of the licensing system undermined
the mechanism’s potential usefulness.80
Scholars tend to agree that the Appendix mechanism neither meets the
expectations of developing countries, nor its own objectives. The
mechanism has not produced any real improvement in access to copyrighted
content,81 which is a pervasive problem that persists in developing
countries.82 Among the main criticisms of the Appendix are its bureaucratic
rules, its limited scope, and its excessive safeguards in favor of right

are inapplicable and unnecessary). But see Bassem AWAD, Moatasem EL-GHERIANI and
Perihan ABOU ZEID, Egypt, in ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 61, at 49 (supporting, in an
analogous case, the efficacy of the Egyptian mechanism of compulsory licensing, in spite
of its compliance with omission of international commitments). The legal reasoning of the
captured Colombian copyright authority is improper, because it subordinates efficacy of
legislative measures to diligence of administrative officers in comply with international
requirements; the compulsory license provided into domestic law is still valid, without
prejudice of the possible international responsibility that the neglected omission of
administrative authority may create for the country. In this case, this s prevented by the fact
that the same authority omitted the self-availing requirement, supports the inapplicability of
the compulsory license, and, plus, is the one in charge of issuing those license, in case.
76
See RENGIFO GARCÍA, supra note 72, at 178 (stating that the provisions that
implement the Appendix of the Berne Convention into the Colombian domestic law lack
any actual application).
77
See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1705.6, Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (providing that state parties cannot issue these compulsory
licenses when its need “could be met by the right holder's voluntary actions but for
obstacles created by the party's measures”).
78
See SERRANO MIGALLÓN, supra note 74, at 161 (stating that the compulsory
licensing mechanism based on public interest has been available “since the first
codification of the independent Mexico”).
79
Telephone Interview with Marco A. Morales Montes, Legal Director, Instituto
Nacional del Derecho de Autor (Mexico) (Apr. 4, 2011).
80
Id.
81
See DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10, at 77.
82
See Margaret Chon, Copyright and capability for education: an approach „from
below‟, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: CURRENT TRENDS AND
FUTURE SCENARIOS 218, 218-49 (Tzen Wong and Graham Dutfield, eds., 2011), (referring
the severe shortage of textbook in developing countries and arguing in favor of reforming
the compulsory licensing system provided by the Appendix of the Berne Convention).
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holders.83 Instead of being an instrument for development, the Appendix
has reduced the ability of developing countries to design public policies to
enable a wide dissemination of knowledge. As a result, countries have
implemented idiosyncratic flexibilities into their domestic law.
B. Developing Countries Are Doing It Their Own Way
Countries have adopted a wide range of alternative solutions into their
domestic law in order to mitigate the limitations and uselessness of the
Appendix mechanism. Some of these solutions reach beyond the
Convention’s foresight. Some are based on copyright exceptions that may
or may not comply with the Berne three-step test. In other cases, countries
have adopted a mechanism of compulsory licensing much broader or more
flexible than the Appendix. For instance, some countries allow licenses to
prevent monopolies for the public interest. Several countries have a pool of
mechanisms to allow access to copyrighted works for purposes of
development. Some of these include copyright exceptions, a diversity of
compulsory licenses, and even expropriation. A few countries have
implemented a more radical measure whereby protected works that have not
been translated enter into the public domain, legitimating the use of works
by others.
Copyright exceptions and limitations are the main strategy developing
countries seem to have adopted to meet their needs. In Chile, for example,
a recent amendment to the copyright act includes three specific exceptions
for translation:84 personal use,85 educational purposes,86 and library
patrons.87 However, the requirements of the Berne three-step test forces
exceptions provided by countries like Chile to remain too narrow to meet
the intended purposes of the Appendix provisions.88 As a result, those

83

See generally Salah Basalamah, Compulsory Licensing for Translation: An
Instrument of Development?, 40 IDEA 503 (2000) (reviewing critically the main provisions
of the Appendix).
84
See Law No.20.435, mayo 4, 2010, Diario Oficial [D.O.], (Chile); see also Daniel
Alvarez, The Quest for a Normative Balance: The Recent Reforms to Chile‟s Copyright
Law, Policy Brief No. 12, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development,
(2011) (briefly describing the whole legal reform).
85
See id., art. 71 R (authorizing the translation of work in foreign languages for
personal use).
86
See id., art. 71 M (authorizing non-for profit translation of small fragments of works
for including them into text books).
87
See id., art. 71 L (authorizing non-for profit libraries and archives to translate works
into Spanish for researching purposes of their patrons, including its reproduction in
quotations).
88
In the case of Chile, during the legislative discussion of the amendment to the
intellectual property act, a proposal was introduced to provide a compulsory licensing
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exceptions satisfy highly limited purposes as they are usually subject to
several conditions. For instance, there may be limitations on the quantity
and quality of use based on the type of work and/or user; restrictions based
on where work may be located and the circumstances in which the works
may be used. As a result, using copyright exceptions and limitations alone
is very limiting for developing countries in their quest for satisfying their
development needs.
Some countries have adopted broader copyright exceptions and
limitations that allow the translation and publication from one language to
another. Whether this type of provisions comply with the Berne three-step
test is a matter of debate. For example, China recently adopted a new
copyright law that sets forth several provisions regarding translation. 89 One
exception allows the translation and reproduction of brief excerpts for
research and teaching.90 A compulsory license allows using a work in
textbooks.91 Additionally, another exception allows the translations of
Chinese authors’ works from Han into the languages of minorities within
the country.92 The latter exception may infringe on the three-step test
because it allows the translation of works without compensation to right
holders. But the application of this exception is severely limited by the
nationality of the author, the source and the target languages. Although
these circumstances mitigate international conflicts that may arise from

system similar to the Appendix, but it did not prosper because its adoption would require
compliance with legal procedures related to the legislative process.
89
Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China] as amended on Feb. 26, 2010
(People’s Republic of China); see also, HONG XUE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN
CHINA 30 (2010).
90
See [Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China], as amended on Feb. 26,
2010 (People’s Republic of China), art. 22 (6) (authorizing translation, or reproduction in a
small quantity of copies of a published work by teachers or scientific researchers for use in
classroom teaching or scientific research, if works are not published for distribution); see
also, Decree No. 468 Regulations on Protection of the Right of Communication through
Information Network (adopted by the State Council, May 10, 2006)(China) art. 6.3
(making the exception available also for using a work on digital environments).
91
See Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 23 as amended on Feb. 26,
2010 (People’s Republic of China)(authorizing compilation of passages from a work and
short written works, among others, for textbooks for compulsory and national education,
under payment and excepting works whose authors have rejected in advance that use); see
also, Decree No. 468 Regulations on Protection of the Right of Communication through
Information Network art. 8 (adopted by the State Council, May 10, 2006)(China)
(providing similar authorization for e-learning).
92
See Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, as amended on Feb. 26, 2010
art. 22 (11) (People’s Republic of China); see also, Decree No. 468 Regulations on
Protection of the Right of Communication through Information Network (adopted by the
State Council, May 10, 2006) art. 6.5 (China) (providing analogous exception for digital
environments).
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China’s violation of the three-step test, they also, prevent the exception
from achieving the Appendix goals with respect to foreign authors and
languages.
In addition to exceptions, some countries have adopted compulsory
licensing schemes that are more permissive than the Appendix. As
mentioned above, this is the case of the United Arab Emirates.93 This also
seems to be the case of South Africa.94 In its copyright law, South Africa
expressly included the translation of works when it authorizes any other
exception, instead of adopting a case-by-case exception for translation.95
The law also confers competence to the South African Copyright Tribunal
to issue a compulsory license when a right holder has unreasonably refused
to do so.96 Additionally, the law allows the government to adopt regulations
on circulation, presentation or exhibition of works, which scholars have
argued would allow possible “non-voluntary licence schemes”.97
Some countries have adopted a general compulsory license regime into
their domestic laws that allows compulsory licenses on public interest
grounds. This is the case of Sudan,98 Syria,99 and Bolivia. The latter, for
instance, has adopted copyright exceptions and limitations in its domestic
and Andean Community laws.100 Although Bolivia has not implemented the
Appendix mechanism, its copyright act authorizes compulsory licenses for

93

See Federal Law No. 7 of the Year 2002 Concerning Copyrights and Neighboring
Rights art. 21 (United Arabs Emirates) (setting for a soft-regulated compulsory license for
translation and/or reproduction of works).
94
See Copyright Act 98 of 1978, as amended in 2002 (S. Afr.); see also, Tobias
Schonwetter, Caroline Ncube and Pria Chetty, South Africa, in ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra
note 61, at 243.
95
Copyright Act 98 of 1978, as amended in 2002, § 12 (11) (S. Afr.) (adopting an
exception for translation that embraces several other exceptions also set forth by law).
96
Copyright Act 98 of 1978, as amended in 2002, §§ 29 – 36 (S. Afr.).
97
Copyright Act 98 of 1978, as amended in 2002, § 45 (S. Afr.); see, Tobias
Schonwetter, Caroline Ncube and Pria Chetty, South Africa, in ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra
note 61, at 243.
98
See Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection Act 1996 (Sudan), § 14, 20(1)
(setting forth several limited exceptions, essentially for reproduction, including one for
translation for personal and private use and providing a compulsory license, according to
which, in case of public interest, government may require right holder publication of a
work, under sanction of order its publication with compensation).
99
See Copyright Law of Syria, Law No. 12/2001 §§ 21, 37 of 27 Feb. 2001 (setting
forth several exceptions that allow the reproduction of works in its source language or its
translation, including some for educational and research purposes and adopting a
compulsory license; in case of public interest, government may require right holder
publication of a work, under sanction of order its publication with compensation).
100
See Law No. 1322 art. 24, Apr. 27, 1992, Gaceta Oficial (Bolivia) (adopting
copyright exceptions and limitation in domestic law); see also Andean Community
Decision 351 Common Regime on Copyright and Neighboring Rights arts. 21, 22, 24-27,
Dec. 21, 1993, Official Gazette of the Andean Community No.145 (adopting several
mandatory copyright exceptions and limitations for Andean Community members).
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the use of a copyrighted work on public interest grounds subject to a royalty
payment.101 There is no evidence, however, that the government has issued
any of these licenses. Moreover, it is unclear the extent to which that
provision of Bolivian domestic law prevails over the common copyright
regime of the Andean Community,102 to which Bolivia is party.103
Adopting the Appendix mechanism and a general compulsory license
based on public interest grounds is a common strategy among some
countries. For example, the Dominican Republic104 and Jordan.105 The
copyright law of the Dominican Republic sets forth not only copyright
exceptions and compulsory licensing inspired by the Appendix; it also
establishes a general compulsory license.106 According to Jordan’s
copyright law, the government may issue a compulsory license for using a
work on public interest grounds and subject to a royalty payment. It is
unclear, however, to what extent the overlap between public interest
compulsory licenses and the Appendix mechanism deprives the latter of
significance. If a country offers both compulsory licenses, there is no reason
to use the Appendix provision because the public interest option achieves
similar results with less paperwork and fewer requirements.
Several countries have gone even further to meet their development
needs, by implementing a public interest “compulsory license” with no
compensation for affected right holders. Cuba, for example, has notified
WIPO to use the Appendix mechanism. Instead of implementing it,
however, Cuba has adopted a real copyright exception with the same

101
See Law No. 1322 art. 25, Apr. 27, 1992, Gaceta Oficial (Bolivia) (authorizing the
government to decree the use for public need of economic rights on a work of great cultural
value for the country, or social or public interest, under previous fair compensation to its
right holder).
102
Common Regime on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, Decision No. 351, Andean
Community (Dec. 17, 1993), 145 Official Gazette of the Andean Community, art. 32
(prescribing that, in any case, compulsory licenses set forth in domestic law of Andean
Community members can exceed limitations allowed by the Berne Convention or the
Universal Copyright Convention).
103
Acuerdo de Cartagena [Cartagena Agreement], May 28, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910 (creating
the Andean Community, which currently is formed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and
Peru).
104
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
105
See supra notes 55 and 56, and accompanying text.
106
See L. No. 65-00 de Derecho de Autor [Copyright Act], art. 48, agosto 24, 2000,
Diario Oficial (Dom. Rep.) (authorizing the government to decree the use for public need
of economic rights on a work of great cultural, scientific, or educational value for the
country, or social or public interest, under previous fair compensation to its right holder);
see also Decreto N° 362-01 que establece el reglamento de aplicación de la Ley N° 65-00
sobre Derecho de Autor [Decree on Implementing Regulations of the Copyright Act],
marzo 14, 2001 (Dom. Rep.), arts. 25 – 28 (regulating the requirements and procedures for
issuing a public interest compulsory license).
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purposes and safeguards of the Appendix mechanism, except for
remuneration of right holders.107 On the one hand, Cuban scholars and
experts assure that the mechanism has been used primarily to overcome the
U.S. embargo and has allowed an important number of translations,
particularly in the fields of medicine and sciences.108 On the other hand,
critics of the Cuban solution have questioned its compliance with
international standards.109 An analogous mechanism is available in
Vietnam’s copyright law. There, the government can adopt restrictions, on
exclusive rights, including compulsory licensing, without mention of any
compensation.110 Curiously, both Cuba and Vietnam have notified WIPO in
order to use the Appendix mechanism, which raises concerns about the
proper understanding that those countries have about the Appendix
mechanism. In other words, those countries that have implemented the
Appendix mechanism into their domestic laws hardly comply with any of
its internationally sanctioned standards, procedures, and requirements.
Some countries have adopted the extinction of copyright protection of
works that are not translated into domestic languages as another measure to
meet their development needs. For instance, Egypt and Kuwait have
adopted this mechanism.111 In the Egyptian case, the law has set forth a
compulsory licensing system that follows the Appendix philosophy in a

107

See, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
Interview with Lillian Alvarez, Scholar and Legal Adviser on Copyright, (Cuba)
(Jun. 28, 2010); see also, Julio Fernández Bulté, Preface to Lillian Alvarez, El Derecho de
¿Autor?: El Debate de Hoy vii-xvi (2006) (recalling the decision of the Cuban government
to use compulsory licenses for overcoming the book shortage created by the American
blockage to the island).
109
See Caridad del Carmen Valdés Diaz, La Facultad de Reproducción, in SELECCIÓN
DE LECTURAS DE DERECHO DE AUTOR 65, 105 (Marta Moreno Cruz et al., 2000) (arguing
that this exception exceeds the standards generally admitted on copyright and it is in
disharmony with the Berne Convention, and reporting the challenge of the WIPO to that
provision).
110
See Intellectual Property Law No. 50/2005/QH11, Nov. 29, 2005 (Viet.), art. 7.3
(setting forth that government may prohibit or restrict exercise the exercise of rights or
compel its licensing for guaranteeing “achievement of defense, security, people’s liferelated objectives and other interests of the State and society”).
108

111

See Law No. 64 of 1999 concerning Intellectual Property Rights, Dec. 29, 1999
(Kuwait), arts. 14, 16.1-2 (setting forth a compulsory license for the publication and
republication of works by Kuwaiti authorship, providing copyright lapsing if translation
into Arabic is not made available within five years of the date of first publication, and
adopting a compulsory license for translating works before its possible copyright lapsing).
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more simplified way.112 The law has also established that copyright
protection of works not translated into Arabic lapses after three years of the
date of first publication.113 If this is the case, the work enters into the public
domain. At this point, interested parties can pay a fee for a license that
allows the commercial and professional exploitation of the work.114
Therefore, in theory, a compulsory license similar to the Appendix may be
requested for translating works within three years of their publication; after
that period, a public-domain license may be requested for translating works
that have not been timely translated into Arabic.115 Some scholars have
raised a concern about this regulation’s consistency with international law;
however, the efficacy of the mechanism also has been contested, since it is
almost unknown among domestic publishers and, in addition, the main
public initiatives that translate works into Arabic do not rely on compulsory
but voluntary licensing.116
The significant number of developing countries that have adopted
idiosyncratic legal mechanisms for granting broader access to copyrighted
works also suggests the inefficacy of the Appendix. This is not a desirable
outcome for at least three reasons. First, it is unclear whether any of these
idiosyncratic solutions is in compliance with international copyright
instruments. This situation creates a risk of conflict before the WTO dispute
settlement system. Second, precisely because of the risk of international

112

Law on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 82 of 2002, Official Gazette,
Jun. 2, 2002 (Egypt), art. 170 (adopting a brief regulation for like-the-Appendix
compulsory licensing) However, Egypt has not renewed its own self-availed notice to the
WIPO Secretariat, the last of them was done in 1990 and was valid up to 1994. See also,
Prime Minister Decree No. 497 of 2005 on Issuing the Executive Regulations for Book III
Of Law No. (82) of 2002 on The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (complementing
the law on compulsory licensing for translation and reproduction of works).
113
See Law No. 82 of 2002 (Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Copyrights and
Neighbouring Rights), Official Gazette, Jun. 2, 2002, art. 148, (Egypt) (providing
“copyright… shall lapse with regards to the translation of that work into the Arabic
language, unless the author or the translator himself exercises this right directly or
through a third party within three years of the date of first publication of the original or
translated work”); see Ahmed Abdel Latif, Egypt‟s Role in the A2K Movement: An
Analysis of Positions and Policies, in, ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN EGYPT: NEW RESEARCH
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 16, 39 (Nagla Rizk & Lea
Shaver, eds. 2012).
114
See Law No. 82 of 2002 (Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Copyrights and
Neighbouring Rights), Official Gazette, Jun. 2, 2002, art. 183 (Egypt) (requiring
governmental license for commercial or professional exploitation of work, against payment
of fees).
115
See Hossam A. El Saghir, Intellectual Property Law in Egypt, in 53 International
Encyclopaedia of Laws 3, 45-46, 65 (2009).
116
See Bassem Awad, Moatasem El-Gheriani and Perihan Abou Zeid, Egypt, in
ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 61, at 22, 49.
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conflict, domestic authorities are discouraged from actually implementing
those mechanisms. It appears as if both authorities and potential users are
reluctant to take advantage of these mechanisms. Third, sui generis features
of domestic solutions impair the emergence of uniform international
standards and practices of both the publishing and educational sectors. More
significantly, the variety of domestic provisions defeats the purpose of
providing an effective solution for developing countries to ensure wider
dissemination of knowledge.
In sum, the Appendix mechanism seems to provide a partial
solution to less than a handful of developing countries that
have notified WIPO’s General Director of their intention to
use of the mechanism. Significantly, no evidence of actual
use has been found. Several other countries have not
notified WIPO of their adoption of the mechanism because
it has proven to be useless, while others have adopted
idiosyncratic solutions into their domestic law. In general,
data suggest that the Appendix of the Berne Convention
has failed to meet the needs of developing countries.
C. The Appendix Does Not Provide a Solution for Minorities
It is unclear whether the provisions of the Appendix of the Berne
Convention apply to the languages of cultural minorities in developing
countries. The Appendix authorizes compulsory licenses to translate works
to languages in general use in the country that issues a license. Although the
Appendix encompasses more than a country’s official languages, it does not
define what is a language in general use.117 For example, between 2005 and
2009, according to the ISBN register, only 323 books were published in 14
native languages in all of Ibero-America (i.e., Latin America, Portugal, and
Spain).118 In contrast, there are 64 native languages and several dialects in
Colombia alone.119 Clearly, the registered amount of publications cannot
satisfy the needs of native communities. A new instrument that provides an
adequate mechanism to meet the needs of developing countries must be
expressly more flexible regarding the languages to which a work can be
117

See WIPO Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention Paris,
Jul. 5-24, 1971, General Report of Paris Conference, ¶ 34 (providing an authoritative
interpretation of this requirement, by stating that a language could be one of general use in
a given geographic region of the country, an ethnic group, and even a language generally
use for particular purposes).
118
See Fomento del Libro America Latina, supra note 60, at 62 (stating that 323 books
were published between 2005 and 2009 in a native language, of them: 82,4% in Guarani;
4,3% in Quechua; and, 4,0% in Aymara).
119
See id., at 76.
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translated. In particular, the new instrument should allow the translation of
works into languages that are not in general use.
Access to copyrighted works for language minorities is an urgent issue in
both developing and developed countries.120 In Spain, for example, along
with “Castilian” (the officially adopted regional language of Castile
commonly known as Spanish), there are several other regional languages in
use. Aranese, Basque, Catalan, Galician, and Valencian, among others were
all banned during the long Franco dictatorship.121 The communities that
currently speak those languages cannot take advantage of the Appendix,
because they are located in a developed country.122 This is also an issue for
the Navajo and Hawaiian populations of the United States, the Ladin and
Slovene communities of Italy, the Inuit in Canada, and so on. Linguistic
minorities in developed countries face serious challenges that mirror those
faced by similar minorities in developing countries. This situation illustrates
that the Appendix wrongly assumes that (1) development is homogeneous
within the borders of a given country and (2) there are no special needs to
be met in developed countries.
When copyright blocks the translation of works into a minority language,
its native speakers are forced to adopt a more generally used language,
possibly condemning the minority language to extinction.123 This situation
raises concerns regarding minorities’ right to identity, and protection of
their cultural diversity. The Appendix has provided developing countries
with flexibilities that facilitate their population’s access to works to improve
social, economic, and cultural conditions. However, the Appendix does not
provide analogous flexibilities for disadvantages communities within
developed countries. If these communities face similar challenges, the
Appendix should not be an obstacle for adopting an analogous solution.

120

See Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention 1973, supra note 33, ¶ 22
(reporting that Canada expressed similar concerns about the relativity of the concept of
developed and developing countries).
121
See JOSEP BENET, CATALUNYA SOTA EL RÈGIM FRANQUISTA: INFORME SOBRE LA
PERSECUCIÓ DE LA LLENGUA I LA CULTURA DE CATALUNYA PEL RÈGIM DEL GENERAL
FRANCO (1978); and, JOSEP BENET, L' INTENT FRANQUISTA DE GENOCIDI CULTURAL
CONTRA CATALUNYA (1995) (referring to the proscription of the Catalan language from the
public space in favor of the Castilian during Franco’s dictatorship, and its effects on the
language, the culture, and the identity of Catalan people).
122
In 2009, 78.32% of the publications done in Spain were in Castilian; 9.55% in
Catalan; 1.92% in Galician; 1.85% in Basque; 1.27% in Valencian; and 0.1% in other
Spanish languages; see Fomento del Libro America Latina, supra note 60, at 60-61.
123
See Peter Austin and Andrew Simpson, Introduction, in Endangered Languages 5
(Peter Austin and Andrew Simpson eds., 2007) (reporting several studies that
conservatively foresee at least the lost of 50% of language diversity in next century, a
process that affects particularly Australia and the Americas).
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Otherwise, the Appendix creates disadvantages for the very development of
those communities. In other terms, the Appendix must adopt a
comprehensive approach to development, not limited to developing
countries, but to any community that requires copyright flexibility for
meeting the needs of its members, being part of a developing or a developed
country.
According to the recently adopted Convention on Cultural Diversity,124
governments must protect and promote cultural diversity, including
linguistic diversity as an essential component of the former. This
convention does not have established any copyright requirements. Instead,
the convention recognizes the importance of intellectual property to
encourage the participation in cultural creativity.125 Copyrights are
essentially “private rights”,126 while cultural diversity is humankind’s
common heritage to be cherished and preserved for the benefit of all.127
Therefore, if copyrights and cultural diversity were to come into conflict,
cultural diversity arguably prevails over copyright.
Any new attempts to infuse the international copyright
regime with flexibilities must be consistent with
governmental obligations to protect and promote cultural
diversity. Consequently, the Appendix must reconsider
whether language access is only an issue for developing
countries or a broader issue that also involves developed
countries. This may become an urgent matter in coming
years as a globalized environment accelerates the loss of
cultural and linguistic diversity.
D. The Appendix‟s Application to Digital Works Is Unclear
At the time the Appendix was adopted, the Internet and digitalization of
content were not a reality, at least not in its current proportions. Today, by
contrast, according to the International Telecommunication Union, there are

124

UNESCO, Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions, Oct. 20, 2005, Records of the General Conference 83 [hereinafter Convention
for Cultural Diversity].
125
See Thierry Desurmont, Considerations on the Relationship between the
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions and
the Protection of Authors' Rights, 208 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 2
(2006).
126
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, Preamble (“recognizing that intellectual
property rights are private rights”).
127
See Convention for Cultural Diversity, supra note 124, Preamble (recognizing “that
cultural diversity forms a common heritage of humanity and should be cherished and
preserved for the benefit of all”).
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around two billion users around the world: thirty percent of the global
population.128 Technology allows the expeditious and inexpensive
production and distribution of content. Ironically, digital content is
asymmetrically available throughout the world, with people in developed
countries having more access than people in developing countries. Although
content can be produced at a low cost, technology itself remains expensive,
particularly for developing countries. As a result, some developing
countries have not prioritized their Internet-related public policies, even
when these could increase access to knowledge. For these governments,
Internet policy is an objective for the distant future. However, as the cost of
technology decreases, people from less developed countries will likely
enjoy the benefits of technological advances. Hence, the question arises:
Does the Appendix mechanism of compulsory licensing apply to the online
environment?
The Appendix of the Berne Convention may suggest that it does not
provide a legal framework of flexibilities respect to digital works. The
provisions of the Appendix expressly limit their application to the nondigital environment, as they expressly allow the translation and
reproduction of a given work “in printed or analogous forms of
reproduction.”129 This clause suggests that digital forms of reproduction are
excluded from the scope of the Appendix. This exclusion may explain why
some Appendix provisions have a strong territorial character and seem
inappropriate for digital environments. For instance, the requirement that
nationals of the country issuing a license must do the translation;130 the ban
on exports;131 the hypothesis of “out of print” editions;132 the exhaustion of
stock;133 and in situ sales.134
Nevertheless, the Appendix provisions are fully operational in online

128

See Key Global Telecom Indicators for the World Telecommunication Service
Sector,
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION,
http://www.itu.int/ITUD/ict/statistics/at_glance/KeyTelecom.html (last visited: May 15, 2011).
129
See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, arts. II (1), II (2) (a), & III.7.
130
See id. Appendix, arts. IV (4 (a) and IV (5) (assuming that translation services would
be provided in situ within the same country that issues and takes advantages of the
compulsory licenses).
131
See id. Appendix, art. IV (4) (a) (excluding exporting would make no sense on
digital environment).
132
See id. Appendix, art. II (2) (b) (excluding digital copies of a work, since they would
be out of print hardly, because of their easy reproduction).
133
See id. Appendix, art. II (6) (excluding digital copies because the provisions would
assume there is a physical stock susceptible of being exhausted, which would seem
inconceivable in case of digital copies).
134
See id. Appendix, art. III (2) (a) (excluding online sales, by requiring they have
place in the country).

WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP

28

Beyond the Appendix of the Berne Convention

environments.135 Neither the Convention nor any other subsequent
international instruments on copyright, such as the TRIPS Agreement
(1994) or the WIPO Internet Treaties (1996), has excluded the application
of the Appendix to digital works and online environment. Moreover, the
terms and provisions of the Appendix have a technologically neutral
meaning. In other words, the Annex provisions refer to processes, such as
translation and reproduction, rather than to a specific technology. Although
the Appendix does include some limitations, these are not intended to
exclude the online environment from the scope of the Appendix. Rather,
these limitations sought to ensure that the Appendix flexibilities favor only
developing countries. Several of these flexibilities set forth territorial or
availability limitations that can be preserved through the use of technology.
Therefore, when properly analyzed, the Appendix allows developing
countries to take advantage of its provisions both on and off-line.
WIPO documents confirm that the Appendix may apply to online
environments and that developing countries may, therefore, make use of
digital technologies to implement its provisions. According to WIPO
Guidelines, the phrase “in printed or analogous forms of reproduction”
means that the mechanism applies to “similar” works, such as books and
printed materials, as opposed to films and records.136 Another clause of the
Appendix ratifies this interpretation when it unequivocally distinguishes
between “in printed or analogous forms of reproduction” and “audio-visual
forms.”137 Finally, interpreting the Appendix in light of its goals and
purposes and in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,138 the WIPO Guidelines state that what is ultimately important is
“the purpose of the translation, namely teaching, scholarship and
research”.139 This statement suggests that as long as the use of the work
achieves the intended purpose, the form of the work becomes irrelevant.
For international copyright scholars, whether the Appendix provisions
apply to the online environment is a matter of debate. For authors writing at
the time of the Appendix approval, its application to the digital environment

135

See FOMETEU, supra note 59, at 21-22 (stating that compulsory licenses for
translation and/or reproduction set forth by the Appendix apply to “any work able of being
printed”, and suggesting that it may apply to digital networks, if works were able of being
controlled as the Appendix requires).
136
See WIPO Guide, supra note 14, at 153.
137
See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. III (7); see also, WIPO Guide,
supra note 14, at 165.
138

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (recognizing the teleological interpretation of a treaty, thus is, “in the
light of its object and purpose”).
139
WIPO Guide, supra note 14, at 153.
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was not even a topic in discussion.140 However, for a majority of scholars
the clause “in printed or analogous forms of reproduction” did not intend
to exclude digital formats. Rather, the phrase sought to allow the translation
and reproduction of any written work as opposed to recordings. 141 A
competing interpretation of the Appendix provisions arose later, during the
1980s, claiming that the Appendix provisions prevent the translation and
reproduction of works in digital format.142 According to this odd
interpretation, the word “analogous” means “the opposite of digital,” a
meaning hardly plausible to the Appendix drafters in 1971.143 Moreover, the

140

See e.g., DELIA LIPSZYC, LA CONFERENCIA DE REVISIÓN DE LAS CONVENCIONES DE
BERNA Y UNIVERSAL (PARIS – JULIO DE 1971): ENFOQUE ARGENTINO (1975).
141
See Ulmer, supra note 24, at 360, 369 (explaining that the purpose of the Appendix
is prohibiting translation by means of recordings); S. M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 164, 171 (1983) (stating that the purpose of the
Appendix is facilitate the translation of works, but not records and performances);
NORDEMANN, VINCK, HERTIN & MEYER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING
RIGHTS LAW: COMMENTARY WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 302
(1990) (stating that the reproduction refers to any printing process, because the decisive
point is that the work is visually perceivable); DESBOIS, FRANÇON, & KÉRÉVER, LES
CONVENTIONS INTERNATIONALES DU DROIT D’AUTEUR ET DES DROITS VOISINS 295-297
(1976) (explaining that the wording of the Appendix attempts to exclude phonograms and
films from compulsory licensing); see also, Henri Desbois, La Conférence Diplomatique
de Révision des Conventions de Berne et de Genève, in 68 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU
DROIT D’AUTEUR 3 , 38-39 (1991).
142
See RICKETSON, supra note 22, at 638 (stating without foundations that compulsory
licenses set forth in the Appendix do not apply to works embodied in a computer data
base); SAM RICKETSON, WIPO STANDING COMMITTEE ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED
RIGHTS, STUDY ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN
THE
DIGITAL
ENVIRONMENT
33
(2003),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_9/sccr_9_7.pdf (suggesting that the
compulsory licensing adopted by the Appendix of the Berne Convention does not apply to
digital environment, but omitting again any reasoning supporting that suggestion); and,
Sam RICKETSON and Jane C. GINSBURG, supra note 22, at 930 (saying compulsory licenses
exclude works embodied in electronic form); see also, MIHÁLY FICSOR, Copyright and
Transfer of Knowledge, in 17 UNESCO COPYRIGHT BULLETIN 6, 15 (1983) (suggesting
that the rules of the Appendix do not apply to computer technologies, but supporting the
need to extend them to new uses that serve the same purpose). But see, MIHÁLY FICSOR,
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR
INTERPRETATION, AND IMPLEMENTATION 278-280 (2002) (mitigating its initial suggestion
by admitting some narrow application of the Appendix provisions on digital networks); see
also, MIHÁLY FICSOR, LIMITACIONES Y EXCEPCIONES AL DERECHO DE AUTOR EN EL
ENTORNO DIGITAL, 32-33 (2008) (supporting his latter interpretation of the Appendix
provisions).
143
Those who argue the Appendix of the Berne Convention does not allow translation
and reproduction of works in digital form relay heavily in the meaning of the word
“analogous” as the opposite of digital. This meaning is misleading because: i) the
Convention uses the word “analogous” in several other provisions with the purpose of
allowing an extensive interpretation, no to exclude digital technologies; ii) in English,
French and Spanish the first sense of the word analogous is similar, likely, or comparable;
in fact, the usage of analogous as opposite of digital or computer technologies has not been
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texts and reports of the Appendix of the Berne Convention and the
Universal Copyright Convention do not support this interpretation.144
Unfortunately, that foundationless restrictive interpretation has prevailed
among scholars,145 even among those who support the inclusion flexibilities
for purposes of development.146 As a result, there is a deeply rooted
mistaken belief that the Appendix provisions do not apply to either digital
works or the online environment.
The Appendix of the Berne Convention allows compulsory licenses for
translation and/or reproduction of foreign digital works into languages of
general use in developing countries. Its provisions do not prohibit licensing
digital works, as that would defeat the very purposes of the Appendix.
However, the Appendix would be a clearer and more useful legal

approved yet, at least by the Spanish Real Academy; iii) the dichotomy between analogous
and digital took place only in the eighties, precisely when the restrictive interpretation of
the provisions of the Appendix came up.
144
As a matter of fact, the General Report of Paris Conference does neither support the
exclusion of digital works nor provide an explanation of the Appendix of the Berne
Convention in this point. Instead, the Report of the General Repporteur of the Universal
Copyright Convention analyzes its analogous provisions extensively. It explains that
translation and reproduction refer to writings but exclude “sound recordings and any other
form except one from which it can be read or other wise visually perceived.” Compare
General Report of Paris Conference 1971, supra note 35, at ¶¶ 27 – 43, with Revision of
the Universal Copyright Convention 1973, supra note 33, at ¶¶ 87 and 112.
145
See, e.g., Juan Carlos Monroy Rodríguez, Necesidad de Nuevas Limitaciones o
Excepciones para Facilitar la Digitalización y Puesta a Disposición de Obras Protegidas
en el Marco de la Educación Virtual, 14 REVISTA LA PROPIEDAD INMATERIAL 195 (2010)
(suggesting that international instruments on copyright are limited to the non digital
environment); JUAN CARLOS MONROY RODRÍGUEZ, WIPO STANDING COMMITTEE ON
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS, STUDY ON THE LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF EDUCATIONAL AND RESEARCH
ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 48-49 & 237 (2009) available at
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=130303
(excluding
any
applicability of the Appendix to works published in digital format and supporting his
statement on Mihály Ficsor); see also, DANIEL SENG, WIPO STANDING COMMITTEE ON
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS, STUDY ON THE COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS FOR THE
BENEFIT OF EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES FOR ASIA AND AUSTRALIA 16, 18 (2009), available
at http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=130249 (stating that the
Appendix does not apply to recordings nor works in electronic form based on Sam
Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg’s work); RICARDO ANTEQUERA, LAS LIMITACIONES Y
EXCEPCIONES AL DERECHO DE AUTOR Y LOS DERECHOS CONEXOS EN EL ENTORNO
DIGITAL,
WIPO
Document
(2005),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/lac/es/ompi_sgae_da_asu_05/ompi_sgae_da_asu_05_2.p
df (omitting any mention to the Appendix of the Berne Convention and similar compulsory
licenses in his analysis of exceptions and limitations applicable to the digital environment).
146
See e.g., FOMETEU, supra note 59, at 21, 22 (expressing doubts whether the
provisions of the Appendix apply to digital works); see also, CLAUDE COLOMBET,
GRANDES PRINCIPIOS DEL DERECHO DE AUTOR Y LOS DERECHOS CONEXOS EN EL MUNDO:
ESTUDIO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 180 (1997) (suggesting doubts by expressing that
several technologies have not been handled by the Berne Convention, including those
related with information technology).
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instrument if it unequivocally stated its full applicability to digital works
and online environment to allow developing countries to take advantage of
available technologies for a wider dissemination of knowledge.147

IV. A NEW INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENT IS NECESSARY TO MEET
DEVELOPMENT NEEDS
As mentioned above, developing countries are not using the Appendix
mechanism due to its bureaucratic requirements, limited advantages, and
high transactional cost, among others. Moreover, the application of the
Appendix in digital works and online environments is debatable, and it is
also elusive for protecting linguistic minorities. The fact that the Appendix
does not meet the needs of developing countries is by itself enough to
justify a new and more effective instrument. This section, however, presents
two additional arguments in favor of adopting a new Appendix for the
Berne Convention. First, developed countries should provide proper
flexibilities to developing countries for general welfare policy. Second,
authors and right holders should consider the opportunities offered by an
adequate international arrangement.
A. Adopting Flexibilities to Advance Enforcement
Most international instruments on intellectual property have focused on
harmonizing the protection for right holders through substantive minimal
legal standards. The Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, and even the
WIPO Internet Treaties have forced some uniformity onto aspects such as
the range of exclusive rights granted to authors, the term of protection, the
requirements for limitations and exceptions, among others. The actual
enforcement of these internationally harmonized rights, however, has been
left mainly to domestic law.
In recent years, developed countries have emphasized the need for an
international regime for the effective enforcement of intellectual

147

But see, Law No. 22 of 1992 on the Protection of Copyright and its Amendments
(Jordan), as amended by the Amending Law No. 9 of 2005, art. 11 (setting forth an
Appendix-like compulsory license for translating and/or publishing “in a printed form or
any other form” to the Arabic language); Decree No. 468 Regulations on Protection of the
Right of Communication through Information Network (adopted by the State Council, May
10, 2006), (China) (providing compulsory licensing for translation and use of work on
digital environment, but only respect to works by national authors).
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property.148 The European Union has agreed to a unified standard of
intellectual property enforcement within its Internal Market.149 The United
States also has included standards of enforcement in its bilateral
negotiations, particularly in all free trade agreements entered in the last
decade.150 Both the European Union and the United States, together with
other developed economies, recently attempted to converge on an
international instrument for enforcing intellectual property, the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement.151 The United States is also negotiating
similar provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, an initiative
that deepens free trade within the Pacific rim.152 The enforcement of
intellectual property, therefore, is a well-established issue in the
international agenda of developed countries.
Developing countries, in contrast, have expressed different concerns.
Focusing on intellectual property enforcement is not only counterproductive
vis-à-vis their comparatively weaker economies; it also raises public policy
and human rights concerns. As a result, developing countries have
supported their own “Development Agenda” to obtain the flexibility that is
currently lacking in the existing international legal framework. In this
context, for example, proposals for treaties on the protection of traditional
knowledge, copyright access for people with disabilities, and copyright
exceptions for educational purposes have been introduced before the
WIPO.153 Developing countries have raised their voice to draw attention to

148

See e.g., G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit Leaders Declaration Toyako Declaration on
World
Economy,
July
8,
2008,
¶
17,
available
at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2008/doc/doc080714__en.html
(last
visited: Mar. 27, 2012) (encouraging the negotiations of an international instrument for
enforcing intellectual property; G8 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia,
United Kingdom, and United States).
149
See Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 47 (adopting a
harmonizing regulation for intellectual property enforcement within the European Union).
150
The United States has included similar provisions in FTAs with Singapore, Chile,
Morocco, Australia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and
Dominican Republic, Bahrain, Oman, Peru, Colombia, Panama, and Korea. See Free Trade
Agreements, U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements (last visited May 15, 2011).
151
See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, preamble, Dec. 3, 2010, available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/Final-ACTA-text-following-legal-verification.pdf
152
See Trans-Pacific Partnership – Intellectual Property Rights Chapter: Draft – Feb.
10, 2011 (unofficial leaked version), available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf
153
See PROPOSAL BY BRAZIL, ECUADOR AND PARAGUAY, RELATING TO LIMITATIONS
AND EXCEPTIONS: TREATY PROPOSED BY THE WORLD BLIND UNION (WBU), (WIPO
Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights 2009) available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_18/sccr_18_5.pdf;
and,
AFRICAN
GROUP, DRAFT WIPO TREATY ON EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS FOR THE DISABLED,
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the insufficiency of international intellectual property instruments on to
meet development needs.
Although it may seem reasonable for developed countries to strive for an
adequate level of enforcement for intellectual property, that is not the case
for developing countries. If developed countries want developing countries
to cooperate in the enforcement of intellectual property, it is necessary to
work on an agenda that provides the latter with enough flexibility to meet
their needs. Otherwise, the international regulation of intellectual property
will accentuate current inequities, seriously risk its own legitimacy, and
exclude developing countries from effective enforcement. Any enforcement
agenda that does not include the interests of developing countries will be
unable to count with their support. In this context, future negotiations of
international copyright instruments must incorporate new flexibilities for
development purposes, particularly in the case of the already forty-year old
Paris Act of the Berne Convention.
B. Providing Opportunities for Authors and Rights Holders
Every time the adoption of new flexibilities for developing countries is
discussed in international forums, copyright holders express their concern.
The core of their objections is that, although the needs of developing
countries are indeed urgent, it is unfair to ask authors to bear the burden of
meeting those needs.154 Right holders from developing countries also
oppose the adoption of new flexibilities. In their view, new flexibilities may
provide foreign authors with a competitive advantage that would ultimately
undermine domestic creativity. These concerns overstate the potential
damage and completely ignore the benefits of flexibilities for authors and
rights holders.
Translating works into new languages does not only provide access to
people and opportunities for countries, it also opens new markets for the
authors of translated works. For example, an adequate mechanism of
notification may allow authors and right holders to learn about opportunities
for their works in foreign markets. This way, authors can focus their efforts
on deciding whether to enter the given local market directly or to allow
domestic licensees to do so through voluntary licenses. Even if the right

EDUCATIONAL AND RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS, LIBRARIES (WIPO Standing Committee on
Copyright
and
Related
Rights
2011)
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_22/sccr_22_12.pdf
154
See LIPSZYC, supra note 140, at 9, 42 (arguing that mechanisms such as the one
adopted by the Appendix imply a subsidy from the authors to development); see also
MOUCHET, supra note 22, at 75-78.
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holder is not in a position to control the translation of works into a foreign
language, she may still rely on domestic publishers subject to a guarantee
for the fair payment of royalties. Overall, translating works offers authors
and copyright holders the opportunity to assess the advantages of entering a
certain market with the possibility of sharing the risk with an intermediary.
Figure 2: Top Book Exporting Countries by Market Share, 2009.

SOURCE: CERLALC, El Espacio Iberoamericano del Libro 2010.

A new regime of flexibilities may also provide opportunities for authors
and right holders different from those available in large markets of
developed countries. Although some developing countries have big
markets, most have modest markets with small and medium size publishers,
limited editions, and a reduced demand. The current mechanism adopted by
the Appendix underestimates the limitations of most developing countries’
markets and, instead, works under the assumption that these markets are as
voluminous as those in developed countries. Figure 2 shows market size of
top book exporting countries. In that pie chart, Latin America and the
Caribbean represent barely 2.7% of the total, while African countries are
only a 0.3%. Moreover, there are significant differences among developing
countries’ markets. For instance, Figure 3 shows that 77.7% of the Latin
American book production is concentrated in four economies.
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Figure 3: Latin American Production of Titles, 2009.

SOURCE: CERLALC, El Espacio Iberoamericano del Libro 2010.

To provide opportunities for authors and right holders, a new regime of
flexibilities needs to recognize the limitations of developing countries’
markets. For instance, as mentioned above, several Central American
countries have compulsory licenses for translating and reproducing works
that remain useless due in part to a lack of domestic publishers and reduced
size of markets. In El Salvador, a country with around six million people,
three of the only five existing publishing companies release less than twenty
titles per year.155 Similarly, in Chile, the average print run of a book is less
than 500 copies.156 The transactional costs of using the Appendix are too
high for publishers from developing countries that operate in these small
capacities and market sizes.
Despite market limitations of developing countries, there are two market
concepts that help explain how developing countries still offer opportunities
for authors and right holders: niche market and economies of scale. A niche
market is a fraction of the market formed by a reduced number of
consumers with similar and easily identifiable needs. For instance, readers
of Mapudungun, a language spoken by around 500,000 people mainly in the
Southern of Chile constitute a niche market.157 The size of this specific

155

See Fomento del Libro America Latina, supra note 60, at 75 (noting that, according
to 2009 statistics, 68% of Latin-American publishers publish less than 20 books per year,
and only 5% publish more than 100 books per year).
156
See AGENCIA CHILENA INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER, INFORME
ESTADÍSTICO
2010
35-36
(2011),
available
at
http://www.camaradellibro.cl/archivos/estadisticas/isbn2010.pdf (stating that less than 500
copies per book has been the prevailing number in Chile during last decade, and it
represents 53.57% of the 2010 production).
157
See Fernando Zúñiga, Mapudunguwelaymi am? "¿Acaso ya no hablas
Mapudungun?": Acerca del Estado Actual de la Lengua Mapuche, 105 ESTUDIOS
PÚBLICOS 9, 9 (2007) (discussing the number of speakers of Mapudungun and concluding
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market is extremely reduced when compared to a typical market in
developed countries. Because of their size, large-scale providers usually
disregard niche markets; this, in turn, allows small providers the
opportunity to offer goods and services tailored for those consumers.
Authors and right holders that cannot or do not wish to exploit niche
markets on their own may do so through voluntary and/or compulsory
licensees.
A niche market must be small enough to be disregarded by big providers,
but big enough to appeal to small providers. For example, there are around
100,000 Guarani speakers in Argentina. This number is too small to
incentivize the translation and reproduction of works. If the number of
Guarani speakers and potential consumers increases, however, reproducing
translated books may be attractive because the cost of unit production
decreases when the number of produced units increases. For instance, if it
were possible to compound Argentinean, Brazilian and Paraguayan Guarani
speakers, we would be looking at a market of around 6 million potential
readers.158 This market would surely be attractive for some providers and,
therefore, for authors and right holders of works translated into that
language.
The mechanism of the Appendix should recognize the benefits of
economies of scale that result from aggregating demand from different
countries.159 Unfortunately, this is not the case. First, the export of works
produced under the Appendix mechanism is prohibited.160 Although the
Appendix provides for some exceptions to this ban, numerous requirements

that it is in such a linguistic precariousness that if no public policies and private initiatives
address it in short-term the language may disappear).
158
Paraguay has a singular situation in Latin America in which a native language is
mainstream. Of more than 6 million habitants, 90% speak Guarani while only 55% speak
Spanish. Guarani is also the main native language in the publishing sector in Latin
America, around 80% of the books published in native languages in the region between
2005 and 2009 were in Guarani, totaling 258 titles. See Fomento del Libro America
Latina, supra note 60, at 62, 66.
159
See FOMETEU, supra note 59, at 43 (suggesting that exportation should be allowed to
countries with “similar level of development which are not covered by the original copies
and which have made the declaration required by the Appendix.”); see also, Revision of
the Universal Copyright Convention 1973, supra note 33, at ¶ 32 (referring to an African
proposal for allowing developing countries having a common language to obtain a joint
compulsory license, which was not approved).
160
See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. IV (4) (a); see STEWART, supra
note 141, at 164 (stating that the intended purpose of this restriction was preventing works
produced in developing countries from being available in markets of developed countries
and undercutting authorized copies there). However, the restriction on exporting applies
not only when sending works from a developing to a developed country but from any
country to another.
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have made the exceptions effectively inoperable.161 Second, although
offshore printing is technically allowed,162 overcoming border measures can
be extremely difficult for works reproduced under a license issued by
foreign authorities. These types of limitations diminish the possibility of
using an economy of scale approach to countries that share a language. For
instance, small Portuguese speaking countries163 cannot import works
translated and reproduced into Portuguese in Brazil under a compulsory
license issued by Brazilian authorities.164 Spanish-speaking countries of the
Americas, French-speaking countries of Africa, and Arabic-speaking
countries of the Middle East are in the same situation.
Some scholars from developing countries argue that mechanisms such as
the Appendix force domestic authors to compete with foreign authors on
unfavorable terms.165 This argument is wrong, if not misleading. Its
proponents erroneously assume that works available under a compulsory
license do not generate copyright royalties for right holders. Those works,
however, must pay royalties. The Berne Convention requires payment of

161

Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. IV (4) (c).
Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, arts. IV (4) (a) and IV (5) (setting forth
that publication and reproduction under compulsory license are valid only in the country
that has issued the license, but omitting any mention to printing); see LIPSZYC, supra note
140, at 17 - 26 (referring that Argentina proposed an express restriction off shore printing,
but it did not prosper); Roger Fernay, Paris 1971 ou les aventures d‟un “package deal”, in
70 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 3, 32-33 (1971) (referring to the
possibility of printing overseas as a concession in favor of developing countries that lack
manufacturing capacities); FOMETEU, supra note 59, at 25 (mentioning that overseas
printing is allowed by the Appendix, but subject to some restrictions); and, ULMER, supra
note 24, at 357-359, 362 (stating the exportations are forbidden in principle, but allowed in
some cases, such as when countries lack capacities); See also, General Report of Pais
Conference 1971, supra note 35, ¶ 40; Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention
1973, supra note 33, ¶¶ 74, 114 and 115; and, WIPO, supra note 14, p. 168. But see
FICSOR, Copyright and Transfer of Knowledge, supra note 142, at 11 (stating that copies
must be printed in the developing country that issued the license).
163
Four of the eight countries that have Portuguese as an official language are not
parties of the Berne Convention: Angola, Mozambique, Sao Tome e Principe, and TimorLeste.
164
For accuracy, Brazil does not have any specific exception or compulsory licensing
system for purposes of translation and reproduction of works in foreign language into
Portuguese or any other native language. See Pedro de Paranaguá Moniz, Excepciones y
Limitaciones al Derecho de Autor en Brasil: Logrando un Equilibrio entre la Protección y
el Acceso al Conocimiento, in ACCESO A LA CULTURA Y DERECHOS DE AUTOR 55-62
(Alberto Cerda Silva ed., 2008) (referring to the lack of Appendix-like compulsory
licensing in Brazilian copyright law, but the convenience of adopting this system in spite of
its complexities); See also, Pedro Mizukami et al, Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright
in Brazil: A Call for Reform, en Shaver, Lea (ed.), Access to Knowledge in Brazil: New
Research on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Development, (London, Bloomsbury,
2010), pp. 41-78.
162
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compensation according to “standards of royalties normally operating on
licenses freely negotiated between persons in the two countries
concerned.”166 Calculating royalties according to the formula established in
the Appendix is highly restrictive. The rates of developed countries drive
average royalty rates up which increases the cost of access for developing
countries. Moreover, higher rates undermine a wide dissemination of
knowledge and ultimately force developing countries to give up a given
content. Abiding by domestic royalties should not damage the interests of
foreign authors and other right holders. Domestic royalties simply are
sources of income the authors are not receiving because their works are not
exploited in domestic markets abroad. Then, using this formula would not
harm domestic right holders either; in terms of copyright royalties, they
would be competing on an equal plain with foreign authors.
Detractors of flexibilities for developing countries argue that facilitating
the translation and reproduction of works into foreign languages may
destroy booming markets for the main colonial languages: English, French,
and Spanish. Although there is no data available about the actual size and
functioning of those markets as a whole, there is data about some specific
countries. It is fair to say that the main book exporting countries are in the
best position to become the main translation producers, because they have
broader manufacturing and publishing capacities. As figure 2 showed, the
United States controls more than 16% of the exports.167 In contrast, less
than 3% of the US’ entire production are translations.168 Moreover,
according to data collected by the University of Rochester, in 2010 only 317
books translated into English were published; 48 of those were originally
written in Spanish.169 The United Kingdom, the world’s second largest book

165

See Lipszyc, supra note 140, at 44 (supporting this argument, by expressing that,
“unprotected foreign works substitute domestic ones”).
166
Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. IV.6 a) (i).
167
See Fomento del Libro America Latina, supra note 60, at 172.
168
See THREE PERCENT: A RESOURCE FOR INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE AT ROCHESTER
UNIVERSITY,
http://www.rochester.edu/College/translation/threepercent/index.php?s=database
(last
visited: May 16, 2011) (suggesting, however, that 3% is a number a little high, since it may
include not only first-time translated books, but also books that have been printed and
translated several time, such as classical literature).
169
In 2008, 362 translated books were published into English, 48 of them were
originally written in Spanish; in 2009, 357 translated books were published into English, 62
of them were originally written in Spanish. See THREE PERCENT: A RESOURCE FOR
INTERNATIONAL
LITERATURE
AT
ROCHESTER
UNIVERSITY,
http://www.rochester.edu/College/translation/threepercent/index.php?s=database (last visit:
May 16, 2011) (limiting statistics to original translations published or distributed in the
United States).
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exporter with a 15,9% market share,170 only published 93 books translated
from Spanish in 2007.171 These numbers suggests that, even in the case of
main colonial languages that enjoy the benefits of economies of scale,
voluntary licenses for translation are still limited. These numbers also
indicate that the existing international legal framework does not facilitate
translations from one language to another.
Available data from Latin-American countries shows that translations are
few and mostly of works written originally in English. In 2008, of 46,993
books published in Brazil. 6,626 were translations into Portuguese and
60.1% of these were from English sources.172 The same year, of 6,469
books published in Mexico, only 164 were translations into Spanish, and
66% of these were from English sources.173 Similarly, in 2010, 5,107 books
were published in Chile; 302 of them were translations into Spanish, 77.5%
of which from originals in English.174 The relatively high numbers of
translations from English in Brazil may be explained because few countries
speak Portuguese and, therefore, Brazil cannot satisfy its domestic demand
with books published in other countries. English is the main language
translated into Spanish and Portuguese in Latin American because English
is the predominant language in technical and commercial fields.175
The absence of book translations in developing countries impairs public
access and, consequently, the satisfaction of development needs. The lack
of translations is also detrimental for authors and right holders who cannot
tap new markets to exploit their works. A new international legal instrument
must allow properly functioning market niches and economies of scale to
cure this deficiency.

170

See Fomento del Libro America Latina, supra note 60, at 101.

171

See Oficina Económica y Comercial de España en Londres, Las traducciones de
libros del español al inglés en Reino Unido aumentan un 50% en tres años (Dec. 5, 2007),
available at
http://www.icex.es/icex/cda/controller/pageICEX/0,6558,5518394_5519005_5604470_403
6437,00.html (referring an increase of 50% from 2004, when only 63 translations were
made, to 2007).
172
See Fomento del Libro America Latina, supra note 60, at 43, 84.
173
Id.
174
See AGENCIA CHILENA INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER, supra note 156,
at 12, 30.
175
See Fomento del Libro America Latina, supra note 60, at 99 (referring to a 2010
study by Index Translationum that states English is the predominant source language with
55% of the translations).
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V.

WORKING ON A NEW INSTRUMENT TO MEET DEVELOPMENT NEEDS

The Appendix of the Berne Convention intended to meet the needs of
developing countries by providing access to copyrighted works to facilitate
their development. Unfortunately, the Appendix failed.176 Although
scholars tend to agree on the inefficacy of the Appendix, there is no
agreement about how this inefficacy can be overcome. Some scholars have
expressed skepticism on whether the Convention can be changed to meet
the needs of developing countries. This group suggests that a solution must
be found in other forums or international instruments.177 Other scholars,
instead, have argued in favor of modifying the Convention to meet
development needs.178
Based on the current Appendix mechanism, this section outlines a
proposal for a new instrument that meets development needs. This proposal
recommends extending the scope of beneficiaries, diversifying the legal
mechanisms that provide flexibility, reducing and simplifying the
bureaucratic requirements, embracing technology opportunities, allowing
exports, and improving the capacity building of the competent international
organization. Lastly, the section considers several factors to take into
account in choosing an international forum for advancing the proposal.
A. Expanding the Scope of Beneficiaries
Development needs are not exclusive to developing countries. Different
minority groups, but linguistic minorities in particular, require special
copyright flexibilities in both developing and developed countries.

176

See also RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY
AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886 – 1986, supra note 22, at 663 (making similar argument when
evaluating the usefulness of the Appendix). But see WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW AND USE 268 ¶ 5.204 (2nd ed. 2004), available at
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/iprm/ (suggesting that the Appendix may favorably
influence negotiation and may lead to increased scope for voluntary licensing), and Mihály
FICSOR, supra note 142, at 10-11 (refusing the argument that the Appendix has favored
voluntary licensing and arguing, instead, that developing countries seem trapped in the
complex and bureaucratic rules of the Appendix and raises doubts about the actual
existence of these compulsory licenses).
177
See, e.g., Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why the Leading International Copyright
Convention Must Be Repealed, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 763, 800 (2003) (arguing that the Berne
Convention does not meet the needs of developing countries, that any radical reforms may
affect the foundations of the system as it, and, therefore, the Berne Convention should be
repealed); ALAN STORY, AN ALTERNATIVE PRIMER ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: EIGHTEEN QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 63 (2009);
DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10, at 78 (stating that if developing countries were to
meet their needs, “they would have to do so outside the Berne system.”)
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Therefore, the Appendix made a mistake when it limited the scope of its
intended flexibilities to developing countries.
A new instrument must adopt a more holistic approach that recognizes
that development challenges have an effect in countries at all levels of
development. This approach would allow the expansion of copyright
flexibilities to communities that cannot fully realize the potential of its
members, regardless of the country where the community is located. The
issue of formulating international intellectual property regulations that cut
across development lines is not new. For instance, TRIPS allowed
countries, regardless of their development status, to issue compulsory
licenses to manufacture pharmaceutical products.179 This solution arose as a
result of the recognition that manufacturing capacities are essentially
relative and, therefore, they do not correspond to either developed or
developing countries alone. To some extent, the aforementioned “ten-year
regime” clause of the Berne Convention also recognizes the mistake of
distinguishing between developing and developed countries when providing
copyright flexibilities. This provision allows any accessing country to
substitute the exclusive right of translation for the lapsing of copyright if a
work is not available in a language in general use in the said country within
ten years from its first publication. Unfortunately, because of its severe
restrictions, this special regime has become useless too.180
It may be argued that domestic law rather than international instruments
should address the challenges faced by particular communities within a
country. This approach might be effective in some cases. For instance,
China allows the translation from the dominant Han into any other minority
nationality language within the country. This type of domestic solution,
however, has a local scope. The Chinese mechanism is limited to works of
Chinese authorship, because the Appendix protects foreign authors. It
would be difficult for China to extend its pro-access policy to works of
foreign authorship and remain compliant with its international commitments
through the Appendix or by implementing a copyright exception.
An adequate solution to address development needs, particularly in the

178

See, e.g. CHON, supra note 82, at 218-249.
See WTO General Council, Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 and Corr.1
(Aug.
30, 2003),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm, See also, Carlos Correa,
Implications of the Doha Declaration on the Trips Agreement and Public Health, 12
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION HEALTH ECONOMICS AND DRUGS SERIES 23 (2002)
available at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Js2301e/.
180
See supra notes 13 – 16 and its accompanying text.
179
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case of oppressed minorities, should go beyond the governmental issuance
of compulsory licenses. An effective solution must allow minority members
to apply for compulsory licenses directly to an international organization in
order to bypass the limitations or negligence of their government. Currently,
there are several mechanisms that authorize nationals to appeal directly to
an international organism, such as the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission, UNESCO, and even WIPO itself.
In sum, a new instrument for providing flexibilities for development
must not be limited to developing countries. Rather, a new instrument
should encompass developing communities. Moreover, a new instrument
should establish a mechanism for minorities to obtain compulsory licenses
from their government or an international body if their government neglects
or denies unreasonably their request.
B. Diversifying the Available Mechanisms
The Appendix of the Berne Convention sets forth a system of
compulsory licensing for the translation and reproduction of copyrighted
works for educational and researching purposes.181 In one case, the
Appendix emphasizes that the use must be non-profit.182 This system of
licensing does not authorize free use. Instead, the Appendix authorizes
compulsory uses with a just compensation to right holders.183 Again, the
Appendix has a reduced scope and real impact because it does not authorize
the for-profit exploitation of a copyrighted work, even when a licensee must
pay compensation to the right holder.
Compulsory licensing could be a reasonable solution for commercial
and/or for-profit uses of a copyrighted work. The Appendix does not allow
for those kinds of uses and adopts instead a torturous solution for essentially
non-profit translation and reproduction. The Appendix creates an absurd
situation where some countries, instead of implementing the Appendix
mechanism to provide a wide dissemination of content, have adopted
exceptions and limitations that run short of meeting that purpose because
they are subject to the three-step test.184 Moreover, the Appendix creates the
paradox that some developing countries have worse conditions of access to
copyrighted works than developed countries.185 At the same time, the
181

See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, arts. II.5 and III.7 b.
See id., at art. II.9(a)(iv)
183
See id., at art. IV.6(a)
184
See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
185
See, e.g., CHON, supra note 82, at 218-249 (referring the paradox that the U.S. and
some European Union countries provide better conditions of access under exceptions than
those available for inhabitants of developing countries).
182
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Appendix has produced the unintended effect that most developing
countries have restricted themselves to adopt a solution based on limitations
and exceptions to copyright.
A new attempt to provide flexibilities for the translation and
reproduction of works for satisfying development needs must make a
reasonable distinction between for-profit and not-for-profit uses. For
example, a new instrument should (1) limit compulsory licensing (i.e.,
compensated authorization) to translation and reproduction for commercial
purposes; and (2) adopt exceptions and limitations (i.e., free authorizations)
for translation and reproduction for personal, educational, research, and
other non-commercial purposes. Assuming the cost of licensing is fair in a
for-profit entrepreneurship, but may overwhelm not-for-profit initiatives.
The Appendix should acknowledge that difference, even when that
distinction can be unclear in borderline activities.
It has been said that a compulsory licensing system is not efficient
because it leads to stagnation as it erodes the needed flexibilities of any
legal regime.186 That is only partially true. The traumatic experience of the
United States with the everlasting compulsory license for mechanical
reproduction is probably the paradigm of that argument.187 However, in
comparative law it is possible to find compulsory licensing regimes that are
much more flexible, both in their pricing and procedure.188 Therefore,
preserving a compulsory licensing system does not necessarily mean
adopting a mechanism that cannot adapt to new challenges.
In addition to exceptions and compulsory licenses, the “ten-year regime”
should be more flexible. Currently, this clause allows the lapsing of
copyright if a work is not available in a language of general use in a given
country ten years from its first publication. There are four modifications
that can render this provision more effective. First, reducing the term in
which the work must be available in the mentioned language. Second,
allowing any developing country to abide by the provision, either at
adhesion to the Convention or later. Third, guaranteeing compatibility with
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See Robert P. Merges, Compulsory Licensing vs. the Three "Golden Oldies":
Property Rights, Contracts, and Markets, 508 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 9 (2004) (stating that
“compulsory licensing has led to price stagnation”).
187
See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1308-1316 (1996) (arguing
against compulsory licensing based on the U.S. local experience with the mechanical
compulsory license for copyrighted music).
188
See, e.g., LIPSZYC, supra note 19, at 243-244 (mentioning that fee for using works
under compulsory licensing can be determined by a legal norm, by an administrative
authority, or a court).

WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP

44

Beyond the Appendix of the Berne Convention

the provision on compulsory licenses for translation and/or reproduction of
works. Fourth, banning retaliation against authors whose countries of origin
have implemented this mechanism. These amendments may partially satisfy
the need developing countries have to widely disseminate works for
purposes of teaching, scholarship, and research.
C. Providing an Unequivocal Solution for Digital Environments
The applicability of the Appendix to digital environments is, to say the
least, unclear. While the Berne Convention provides a standard for
evaluating the adoption of copyright limitations and exceptions in the
context of new technologies, its Appendix does not provide uncontested
rules to allow developing countries to take advantage of new opportunities
in technology. Instead, the myth of the Internet as the perfect borderless
photocopy machine has pervaded legal literature and prejudicing policy
makers against flexibilities for the digital environment.
In contrast to the early beginnings of digital networks, today’s Internet is
a space as susceptible to regulation as any other non-digital environment. In
addition to legal and contractual rules, an increasing number of
technological measures contribute to control and discipline the behavior of
Internet users. It is technically possible to control accessing, using, and
copying contents. It is also possible to adjust the online experience to the
local legal framework of a certain geographical location.189 Moreover,
anonymity is certainly no longer a default feature of online
communications.
In addition to the experience of Yahoo!, Google, and iTunes with
geographical localization systems, it may be extremely useful to survey the
experiences of other initiatives that provide public access to copyrighted
contents. To comply with copyright constraints, those initiatives adopted
sophisticated operational models. For example, Open Library is an initiative
that negotiated particular terms of licensing with publishers to make books
available online. An interesting feature of this initiative is that digital books
behave just like paper books: they are susceptible to temporal public
borrowing; multiple copies are not available simultaneously; each book is
only available to a single person on a one-by-one system. Users must go to
a participating library or other places with accredited IP connections to
download books on their devices for a specific period of time, after which
access to the books is deactivated. Currently, Open Library works in several
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public and university libraries throughout the United States, Canada and,
recently, Guatemala. The Open Library initiative suggests that, with proper
technological and legal support, developing countries may provide broader
access to copyrighted material for their population.
However, the international legal framework is still somewhat evasive of
the possibility of providing a mechanism that allows using digital
environments as platforms to access copyrighted material in developing
countries. If voluntary licenses are not granted, the Appendix seems
insufficient to meet development needs. A new international instrument
must clearly state its application to digital environments,190 and
unequivocally allow digital reproduction and online access. Moreover, a
new international legal instrument must establish limitations and conditions
of such access, specify the status online automatic translation services, and
govern the technological measures that control access and use of
copyrighted material.
An effective solution to provide legal flexibilities for using works on
online environments must take into account the risk of improper use of
technologies. Therefore, developing countries should implement regulation
that prevents illegal use of copyrighted works. Denying access for some
cases may be fair if it is, instead, properly provided in others. In this sense,
a new mechanism must balance the competitive interests of authors, right
holders, users, and communities. In creating such a balance, the price that
developing countries may be forced to pay is the provision of protection and
effective enforcement in cases of illegal use of copyrighted material.
D. Simplifying Legal Paperwork and Requirements
The Appendix of the Berne Convention delivers a compulsory licensing
system for developing countries that is extremely bureaucratic because it
was created on the suspicion that developing countries would misapply the
flexibilities.191 To prevent such theoretical abuse, the Appendix adopted
several restrictions that apply both at the international and domestic levels.
This superposition of requirements makes the framework labyrinthine. The
system is plagued with categories of works, terms, languages, and so on. As
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See JACK GOLDSMITH AND TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET: ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 49-63 (2008) (discussing the increasing use of geo-identification
technologies on the Internet as a measure for making the networks controllable).
190
See supra notes 128-147 and accompanying text.
191
Compare Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix (setting forth an overregulated
system of compulsory licensing) with Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 9 (2) (adopting
a more general and simple system for copyright limitations and exceptions).
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a result, one scholar has qualified this regime as “unworkable.”192
At the international level, a developing country that wants to enjoy the
provisions of the Appendix must not only notify WIPO’s General Director,
it must also renew this notification periodically.193 When countries have not
complied with the notification process at the international level, it is unclear
whether individuals can obtain a license according to domestic law.194 This
is the case for publishers in Latin American countries that have
implemented the Appendix mechanism without notifying WIPO.
At the national level, countries must implement the Appendix provisions
into their domestic law. As a result, countries must carefully adopt a
complex system of rules on categories of works, languages, terms, quality
of translations, etc. Potential licensees have to handle that confusing
regulation. In addition, it is necessary to create a procedure for appearing
before judicial or administrative authorities that generally lack experience
regarding these matters.
Overall, such requirements discourage national publishers from
developing countries from using the Appendix mechanism. These
requirements add new and significant publishing costs to those already in
existence, such as remuneration to translators and compensation to right
holders. In the small markets of developing countries, the additional cost of
Appendix mandated procedures to obtain a compulsory license substantially
increases the final cost of any publishing initiative. As a result, transactional
costs make the Appendix mechanism unviable.
A new international instrument must provide developing countries with
an uncomplicated mechanism through the following measures. Unnecessary
bureaucratic paperwork, such as the WIPO notice renewals should be
deleted. Instead, the mechanism can adopt a more straightforward
notification procedure similar to the one set forth for compulsory licensing
in TRIPS.195 Other improvements could include standardizing rules,
particularly on terms and categories of work, and removing protectionist
measures for colonial languages.196
192

Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “from Below”: Copyright and Capability for
Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803 (2007); see also Ndéné Ndiaye, The Berne
Convention and Developing Countries, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 47 (1986-1987);
RUTH L. OKEDIJI, THE INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM: LIMITATIONS, EXCEPTIONS
AND PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE DIGITAL
ENVIRONMENT
25-26
(2005),
available
at
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/Okediji_Copyright_2005.pdf.
But
see,
RICKETSON and GINSBURG, supra note 22, at 956-960.
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Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, arts. I.1 and I.2.
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See supra note 75.
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See supra note 179.
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Technology could help improve the system. As noted previously, the
new international instrument must state clearly its application to digital
works and online environment. Similarly, the instrument must incorporate
technology to facilitate its application, management, and issuance of
licenses. An online, open, and comprehensive system of information similar
to the one available for domain name system could achieve this goal.197
Such a database would allow public and global research of and notification
to authors and copyright holders of works susceptible of being licensed.
Such system would also enable local authorities to coordinate their actions
and facilitate communications between potential licensees and licensors.
Finally, this database would introduce transparency in the functioning of the
system, which so far is missing from the Appendix.
E. Allowing Exportations
The Appendix mechanism ban on the exportation of works is excessive.
The ban originally intended to prevent works produced under compulsory
license to flood markets around the world. The ban has, however,
undermined the use of the mechanism in countries that lack manufacturing
capacities and in countries with small markets. Although the Appendix
allows overseas printing,198 this measure is not useful when the market of
the licensor country is small. The Appendix also sets forth exceptions that
allow works to be exported from one country to another. 199 But these
exceptions have lost their effect because they are extremely narrow and
bureaucratic.200
A new mechanism for development must recognize the advantages of
economies of scale, particularly for small developing economies, and allow
the export of works produced under compulsory licenses. Some authors in
favor of exportations have limited their support to developing countries that
have issued compulsory licenses.201 However, if the new mechanism seeks
to meet development needs rather than only the needs of developing
countries, exports should not be limited to developing countries. For
instance, the export of certain goods would contribute to meeting the needs
of developing communities in developed countries, such as Amharic or

reducing the period of immunity and eliminating the waiting period).
Whois is the Internet protocol that allows identifying, and sometimes contacting, the
assignee of a given domain name.
198
See supra note 162.
199
See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. IV (4) (a).
200
See id. art. IV (4) (c).
201
See supra note 158.
197
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Mapudungun speakers in the United States. Moreover, requiring licensing
from a new country when the work is already available creates unnecessary
bureaucracy, redundancy of efforts, and artificial barriers for the free flow
of goods.
The new mechanism must also remove obstacles for the free flow of
copyrighted goods. Traditionally, custom authorities have had power to
limit the flow of goods that infringe on intellectual property only in the
exporting or importing countries. In recent years, however, customs
authorities’ competence over in-transit goods has expanded.202 If the new
mechanism allows exportation, then customs authorities from in-transit
countries should not interfere with the free flow as long as the works
comply with customs regulations of the exporting and importing countries.
F. Improving Institutional Support
Competent international organizations on copyright must play a more
relevant role in implementing a solution for development in order to ensure
a wide dissemination of knowledge. Despite the high expectations of the
1970s, under the Appendix, WIPO has played only a minor role on this
matter.203 The mere fact that the Appendix mechanism is still
misunderstood by its beneficiaries and that there has not been any critical
study about it provide enough evidence of WIPO’s precarious involvement.
For those who have been involved with WIPO capacity building programs,
the absence of assistance on flexibilities for developing countries is
astonishing.204
A well-drafted mechanism should specify the role of an international
institution in capacity building of publishers, distributors, booksellers,
authors and right holders from countries or communities that wish to benefit
from the new flexibilities. In addition, the competent international
organization must also provide technical assistance to governments in the
incorporation of flexibilities into domestic law. Moreover, the international
entity could play a more active role in providing technological and financial
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See e.g., Anti- Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, art. 16, Dec. 3, 2010, available
at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/Final-ACTA-text-following-legal-verification.pdf
(authorizing countries to adopt or maintain procedures with respect to suspect in-transit
goods or in other situations where the goods are under customs control, even acting ex officio).
203
See OLIAN Jr., supra note 10, at 110 (suggesting a more active role for WIPO in
implementing a solution for developing countries by facilitating contact between interested
parties and payment of royalties).
204
The author took part as speaker in the XII WIPO/SGAE Regional Academic Course,
Derecho de Autor y Derechos Conexos para Países de América Latina, Santiago de Chile,
Oct. 9-13, 2006.
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support, advice on good practices, and critical analysis on the effective
functioning of the system.
The competent international organization should also be able to improve
access to copyrighted works by developing countries and communities. For
example, the organization could issue compulsory licenses on its own right.
Doing so would contribute to a wider dissemination of knowledge in
countries where governments are reluctant or negligent in issuing licenses
or lack the capacity to implement the international instrument. Moreover,
internationally issued licenses would relieve some of the pressure that
developing countries experience when they attempt to implement
flexibilities into their domestic laws.
G. Choosing an International Forum
Choosing the best forum for adopting a new international instrument
flexibilities for development requires considering political and legal issues,
timing and the schedules of the different possible forums. Rather than
providing a firm answer to this question, this section reflects some of the
advantages and disadvantages of the different alternatives.
The first temptation is to consider revising the Appendix, and possibly
the Universal Copyright Convention, because they both regulate the
compulsory licensing in favor of developing countries. However, modifying
them would be extremely complex because it would entail the organization
of a conference and unanimous approval.205 The 1971 Paris Conference
required preparation that started practically at the very end of its previous
1967 Stockholm Conference. Since then, several attempts to update the
Berne Convention have failed, even when they counted on the right holders
support. Developed countries have circumvented the complexities of
modifying the Berne Convention by adopting new instruments before
WIPO and WTO. The Berne Convention has become a fossil that reminds
us of the copyright standard of the industrial era. Any improvement must
follow another path.
Another possibility is adopting a new international instrument on
flexibilities for development before WIPO. Currently this international
organism, part of the United Nations system, works on several proposals
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See ARPAD BOGSCH, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS OF THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS 67 (1986) (suggesting that the very
success of the Berne Convention has became the cause of its stagnation because its
modification requires the agreement of broad number of countries).
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regarding international instruments on copyright.206 So far, the most
advanced proposal concerns granting access to copyrighted works for
people with disabilities. In spite of its narrow purposes, developed countries
have strongly opposed this proposal. This experience suggests that an
instrument with a broader purpose, such as providing flexibilities for
development needs, may face enormous resistance in that forum.
The WTO is yet another alternative. This international organization
already has experience providing flexibilities in the enforcement of TRIPS.
The WTO allows countries to issue a compulsory license for
pharmaceutical products in case they lack the capacity to manufacture them.
Although this exception was originally a temporary mechanism, 207 it later
became a permanent modification to TRIPS.208 In this sense, the WTO
shows a successful adoption of flexibilities and some level of commitment
in evaluating their implementation and functioning in both TRIPS and the
domestic law of WTO members. Moreover, TRIPS has an enforcement
mechanism that is lacking in the Berne Convention. Finally, TRIPS also has
a larger number of members than the Berne Convention, which suggests a
wide base of potential application for a new instrument.
Adopting an international instrument that provides flexibilities to meet
development needs may take a long time. This is more likely if developed
countries show the resistance they did during the negotiations that
concluded with the adoption of the Appendix. Therefore, it may be
advisable to work initially on a narrower instrument. For instance, seeking
an agreement at the regional or sub-regional level, such as within the
Common Market of the South209 or the South American Community of
Nations.210 This narrower approach may create important opportunities for
granting wider access to sources of knowledge with some additional
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For instance, on access for people with disabilities, on exceptions and limitations for
education, on traditional knowledge, and on protection for broadcast organizations, among
others.
207
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Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 and Corr.1
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30, 2003)
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See Treaty for the Constitution of a Common Market between the Republic of
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positive externalities. For example, empowering regional and native
cultures by promoting the preservation of their linguistic heritage.
Currently, 16% of the translations published in Brazil are from books
initially available in Spanish;211 that number may increase under an
adequate instrument. Language minorities from neighboring countries also
may enjoy the benefits of economies of scale, such as between
Mapudungun speakers of Argentina and Chile; Guarani speakers of
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay; Aymara speakers of Bolivia, Chile, and
Peru, and so on.
Although not fully satisfactory, a regional instrument may be a first step
to adopt an international instrument that provides enough flexibility for a
wider dissemination of knowledge.

VI. FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Appendix of the Berne Convention intended to provide some
flexibility for developing countries in order to meet their needs for a wider
dissemination of knowledge. The Appendix’s system of compulsory
licensing, however, has proven to be inefficient. Developing countries have
not adopted the bureaucratic and limited mechanism of the Berne
Convention. Rather, many of these countries have devised idiosyncratic
solutions in their domestic laws. In addition, the Appendix creates legal
uncertainty about its application to the online environment. Furthermore,
the Appendix falls short of providing solutions that effectively meet
development needs, particularly those of cultural and linguistic minorities.
These criticisms should be enough to encourage the adoption of a new
solution for developing countries. However, adopting such a mechanism
may also allow the advancement of general welfare goals related to the
protection of intellectual property by developed countries. A new
mechanism may even lead to new opportunities for authors and right
holders.
Any new solution for addressing the needs of developing countries must
be informed by the lessons learned from the failure of the Appendix of the
Berne Convention. For instance, a new international instrument must


211

Extend the scope of provisions to both developing
countries and developing communities in developed

See Fomento del Libro America Latina, supra note 60, p. 84.
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countries.
Provide diverse legal mechanisms, beyond nationally
issued compulsory licenses, for a variety of purposes.
Reduce paperwork, bureaucracy, and unnecessary
safeguards that have made the system in force completely
unworkable.
Take advantage of the opportunities offered by technology
both for development purposes and for facilitating the
functioning of the system itself.
Engage competent international organizations to play a
more active role in empowering countries and communities
to take advantage of the system, providing technical
assistance and capacity building, among other
responsibilities.

In its more than forty years in force, the Appendix has failed to meet the
needs of developing countries. A compromise is urgently required in the
international copyright law to allow less developed countries and
communities to participate in the global progress of culture, science, and
technology.
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